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ARTICLES 
PERFECTING CRIMINAL MARKETS 
David Michael Jaros* 
From illicit drugs to human smuggling to prostitution, legislators 
may actually peifect the very criminal markets they seek to destray. Crim-
inal laws often create new dangers and new criminal opportunities. 
Criminalizing drugs creates opportunities to sell fake drugs. Raising 
penalties for facilitating illegal immigration increases the risk that 
smugglers will rely on dangerous methods that can injure or kill their 
human cargo. Banning prostitution increases the underground spread 
of sexually transmitted disease. Lawmakers traditionally respond to these 
"second-order" problems with new waves of criminalization that impose 
additional penalties on fake-drug dealers, dangerous human smugglers, 
and HIV-positive prostitutes. 
But the criminalization of second-order activities also improves the 
criminal markets that gave them birth. Criminalizing the sale of fake co-
caine strengthens the market for genuine drugs. When the law increases 
penalties for dangerous human smuggling, those contemplating illegal 
immigration may pay more for assistance across the border. The total 
quantity of prostitution will rise when the law makes sex for hire safer. 
In sum, efforts to criminalize and punish second-order crimes may inad-
vertently bolster the very criminal markets that legislatures originally 
sought to eradicate. 
This Article suggests that the perfection of criminal markets is not 
just a quirky economic irony. The dynamic relationship between first-
and second-order crimes is relevant to the formation of sound criminal 
justice policy, and it can help explain the rapid expansion of the crimi-
nal code. Moreover, acknowledging that criminal laws may facilitate 
antisocial activity can destigmatize alternative policies that improve 
public welfare &y making illegal activity safer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can criminal laws improve existing black markets? An unexamined 
category of laws may actually make black markets more efficient. Laws 
that criminalize the sale of fake cocaine can improve the market for gen-
uine drugs by reducing the risk that users will buy "bad product." Laws 
that enhance penalties for alien smugglers who injure or kill their hu-
man cargo may increase immigrants' willingness to pay "coyotes" or 
"snakeheads" to transport them across borders. From prostitution to 
human smuggling to back-alley abortions, legislators may actually be bol-
stering the very criminal markets that they seek to destroy. 
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That the criminalization of an activity may actually improve related 
criminal markets has profound implications for criminal justice policy 
and our normative understanding of criminal law. By recognizing the 
impact that new criminal laws can have on existing black markets, policy-
makers can design more effective criminal justice policies and better 
evaluate the true cost of criminalization. Moreover, recognition that 
criminal law can facilitate crime may change how society perceives alter-
natives to criminalization. Critics often disparage harm-reduction strate-
gies such as needle-exchange programs because they theoretically en-
courage illegal activity. But if criminal laws similarly foster illegal behav-
ior, then neither criminalization nor its alternatives should occupy the 
moral high ground. 
In a basic sense, lawmakers are in the business of creating criminal 
markets. All forms of regulation have the potential to drive unwanted 
behavior underground. Criminalizing the sale of illicit drugs creates a 
black market for drugs. Closing the borders creates a market for human 
smuggling. But criminal laws create secondary dangers and new criminal 
opportunities as well. Criminalizing drugs creates the opportunity to sell 
fake drugs. Raising the penalties for facilitating illegal immigration in-
creases the risk that smugglers will rely on dangerous methods that can 
injure or kill their human cargo. 
Lawmakers respond to these new problems in predictable fashion-
with second waves of criminalization and enhanced penalties. More than 
thirty-five states have made it a crime to sell fake drugs. 1 Under federal 
law, if a smuggler causes his human cargo "serious bodily injury," the 
maximum sentence he faces increases from ten years to twenty. 2 Should 
the immigrant die in transit, the smuggler can receive a life sentence or 
even the death penalty.3 
What lawmakers fail to recognize is that the criminalization of these 
"second-order" activities,4 while perhaps protecting society from signifi-
cant harm, also corrects inefficiencies in the criminal markets that gave 
them birth. By criminalizing and enhancing the penalties for activities 
like selling fake drugs, dangerous human smuggling, HIV-aware prosti-
tution, dealing drugs while armed, and performing deadly back-alley 
abortions, lawmakers may strengthen the very criminal markets that they 
originally sought to eliminate. 
1. E.g., Ala. Code § 20-2-143 (LexisNexis 2006); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11355 
(West 2007); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 831.31 (West 2006); Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-13-30.2 (2011); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 218A.140(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law§ 5-617 
(LexisNexis 2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 333.7402 (West Supp. 2012); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 195.242 (West 2011); N.Y. Pub. Health Law§ 3383 (McKinney 2012); 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 780-113(30) (West Supp. 2012). 
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (B) (iii) (2006). 
3. Id. § 1324(a) (1) (B) (iv). 
4. This Article uses "second-order" to distinguish the new antisocial opportunity that 
results from the criminalization of a primary or "first-order" activity. 
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One of the great benefits of applying economic theory to the study 
of law is its capacity to identify unexamined assumptions and open un-
cultivated subjects to further inquiry. An examination of the impact of 
second-order crimes on first-order criminal markets raises basic questions 
about the practical and normative implications of using the criminal law 
to fight antisocial behavior. 
Drawing on economic theory, cognitive psychology, and game the-
ory, this Article examines the complicated dynamic between related 
criminal markets. Many scholars and policymakers have presumed that 
criminal laws deter bad behavior by increasing the cost of engaging in 
antisocial activity.5 This view has led policymakers to avoid alternative 
forms of regulation for fear that they would encourage undesirable activ-
ities. By taking this theory of deterrence on its own terms and provision-
ally accepting its assumption that potential criminals are "rational, econ-
ometrically grounded actors who weigh the qualities and probabilities of 
punishment before acting,"6 this Article demonstrates that criminal laws 
can encourage unwanted behavior in much the same way. As a result, 
policymakers need to account for the impact that criminalization has 
upon related criminal markets when they consider new criminal laws. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores how criminal 
laws create new opportunities to engage in antisocial behavior. While 
numerous scholars have explored the degree to which the criminal jus-
tice system increases individuals' propensity to commit crimes/ few legal 
scholars have examined the role that the criminal law plays in creating 
new criminal markets. This occurs in two distinct ways. First, criminal 
laws can create demand for new types of harmful goods and services that 
are subsequently criminalized. Second, criminalization can create new 
criminal opportunities by pushing markets underground where the gov-
ernment is unable to use regulatory tools that might prevent the new an-
tisocial activity. 
Part II examines how lawmakers inadvertently improve criminal 
markets when they seek to deter harmful second-order activities. While 
5. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. 169, 176 (1968) ("[W]hen other variables are held constant, an increase in a per-
son's probability of conviction or punishment if convicted will generally decrease ... the 
number of offenses he commits."); see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law§ 
7.2, at 278 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis of Law] ("A person 
commits a crime because the expected benefits exceed the expected costs."). As used in 
this Article, "antisocial" activities are those in which the net social benefit is negative; that 
is, the total costs associated with the activity outweigh the benefits. 
6. Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: 
The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 173, 181 
(2008). 
7. See, e.g., id. at 203-04 (suggesting that more punitive criminal justice policies may 
actually raise crime rate by undermining social controls and reducing stigma associated 
with illegal behavior); see also Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 Wis. L. 
Rev. 1049, 1054-74 (cataloging crime-causing effects of incarceration). 
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imposing considerable costs on society generally, second-order criminal 
conduct can create inefficiencies in related, first-order criminal markets 
by generating asymmetries of information, diminishing competition, and 
increasing the cost of illegal activity. By deterring second-order crimes, 
policymakers inadvertently strengthen the very criminal markets that 
they originally sought to eradicate. 
Part III describes some broad implications of perfecting criminal 
markets. The dynamic relationship between first- and second-order 
crimes is not only relevant to the formation of sound criminal justice pol-
icy, it can also help explain the rapid expansion of criminal codes that 
has been the subject of considerable consternation and academic de-
bate.8 Moreover, the recognition that criminal laws actually improve 
black markets may change how we think about criminalization in relation 
to other policy options. Focusing attention on the ways in which criminal 
laws facilitate crime may help to destigmatize alternative harm-reduction 
policies that improve public welfare by reducing the social costs of illegal 
activity. 
I. THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF CRIME 
You murder me now and steal my throne-but one of your own 
sons will dethrone you, for crime begets crime.9 
One of the core goals of the criminal law is to deter antisocial behav-
ior.10 On its face, deterrence appears straightforward. In his seminal arti-
cle applying economic theory to the analysis of criminal law, Gary Becker 
posited that criminals, like any other rational actors, weigh the expected 
benefits of their actions against the expected costs. 11 The criminal law 
8. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
505, 509, 513-14 (2001) (noting dramatic broadening of criminal code over past century 
and a half); see also Sara Sun Beale, VI/hat's Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, 
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) 
Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 23-24 (1997) [hereinafter Beale, Non-Legal Fac-
tors] (discussing sentencing policy developments including "more mandatory minimums, 
three strikes provisions, and extending the,g·ea~:penalty"). 
9. Bernard Evslin, Heroes, Gods and Monsters of the Greek Myths 11 (1967) (re-
counting Uranus's admonition to his son Cronos, who would later be overthrown by his 
own son, Zeus). 
10. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (Kennedy,]., concurring) 
(describing deterrence as "one of the first purposes of criminal law"); Warren v. U.S. 
Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]he core purpose of the criminal 
law[] [is] to regulate behavior by threatening unpleasant consequences should an indi-
vidual commit a harmful act."). This is not to suggest that deterrence is the only possible 
justification for criminal law. Other classic justifications for criminal law include retribu-
tion, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy,]., con-
curring) ("The federal and state criminal systems have accorded different weights at dif-
ferent times to [these] penological goals .... "). 
11. Becker, supra note 5, at 176; see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation's Cost, 
88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 903, 918 (2011) ("Under Gary Becker's famous formulation, the ra-
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thus aims to deter crime by raising the cost of certain antisocial activities, 
thereby diverting rational criminals from the undesirable activity to 
other, legal and less harmful, pursuits. In practice, however, the use of 
the criminal law to deter antisocial behavior is fraught with difficulty. In 
fact, there are times when the criminal law is, itself, criminogenic. 
Crime is capable of begetting more crime in a number of subtle 
ways. Former Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal has observed that the 
criminalization and harsh penalization of one antisocial activity may en-
courage offenders to switch to other endeavors that may be equally or 
even more harmful. 12 Thus, when Congress raised the penalty for pos-
sessing five grams of crack to a mandatory minimum of five years, it inad-
vertently may have induced dealers to substitute the sale of heroin for the 
sale of crack. 13 Professor Katyal further hypothesized that the increased 
criminalization of certain kinds of illegal activity (like heroin use for ad-
dicts) could actually increase the incidence of those activities. Likening 
heroin to a Giffen good-a good which people consume more of as its 
price rises14-Professor Katyal suggested that increased prices for heroin 
could actually induce users to consume more drugs to cope with the mis-
ery oflost income. 15 
Crime also begets incarceration; incarceration, in turn, can beget 
more crime.16 Prisons act as schools for inexperienced criminals, incul-
cating low-level offenders with criminal values as well as educating them 
tiona) actor refrains from wrongdoing when the expected costs of such conduct outweigh 
its expected benefits."). 
12. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2402-08 
(1997) (using sale of crack cocaine and heroin to describe substitution effects in criminal 
law). 
13. Id. at 2402-03. Neither Professor Katyal nor this Article makes any empirical 
claim as to the relative harm of selling crack as opposed to heroin. The point is simply that 
the criminalization and penalization of one activity may lead to the substitution of other 
criminal activities. 
14. The term "Giffen good" comes from the nineteenth-century economist Sir Robert 
Giffen, who is popularly thought to have observed that Irish families paradoxically in-
creased their consumption of potatoes during the Irish potato famine, despite a dramatic 
rise in the price of potatoes. Giffen surmised that the rise in potato prices left families 
substantially poorer, so that they could no longer afford to substitute meat for potatoes. As 
a result, families ate more potatoes than they had in the past, despite the fact that meat 
had become relatively cheaper. Terrence McDonough & Joseph Eisenhauer, Sir Robert 
Giffen and the Great Potato Famine: A Discussion of the Role of a Legend in Neoclassical 
Economics, 29]. Econ. Issues 747,747-48 (1995). 
15. Katyal, supra note 12, at 2436. 
16. Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West &Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incar-
ceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1551, 1554 (2003); see 
also David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentenc-
ing, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1427, 1436 (2011) ("[I]mprisonment itself has criminogenic ef-
fects."); Pritikin, supra note 7, at 1102-03 ("[C]onsidering the full panoply of prison's 
criminogenic effects, our system of incarceration may not even be yielding a nationwide 
net benefit in terms of simple crime prevention itself."). 
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on the means to commit more serious crimesP By separating prisoners 
from their families, incarceration can also weaken the social ties that act 
as "informal social control[s)" to deter criminal activity. 18 Moreover, a 
criminal record can make it substantially harder for an individual to ob-
tain legal employment, thereby increasing the chances that a convicted 
person will have to rely on crime for income in the future. 19 This dy-
namic is exacerbated by the fact that incarceration tends to strengthen a 
convicted person's connection to criminal networks, thereby expanding 
the person's opportunities to engage in further criminal activity. 20 
Incarceration (and thus criminal law) can result in the increased 
criminal activity of third parties as well. As Martin Pritikin observes, 
"[n]ot only does the disruption of family bonds that results from incar-
ceration make those in prison more likely to recidivate, it makes their 
children more likely to commit crime as well. "21 Without the supervision 
of their parents, the children of incarcerated persons have increased op-
portunities to become involved in delinquency and crime.22 Moreover, 
the deleterious economic impact of a parent's incarceration may increase 
the likelihood that a child will pursue the financial benefits of criminal 
activity.23 Indeed, incarceration can have a broad criminogenic effect on 
entire communities as high rates of imprisonment exacerbate the social 
and economic disadvantages that plague impoverished communities 
17. Pritikin, supra note 7, at 1054-55; see also Katyal, supra note 12, at 2398 n.32 
("[W]e must add to th [e) cost[s) of punishment the fact that imprisonment often breeds 
crime because of the unsavory contacts one meets while imprisoned, contacts that may 
reduce the cost of further criminal activity."). 
18. Fagan & Meares, supra note 6, at 196-202 (describing how weakened family and 
community structures undermine informal social control); see also Pritikin, supra note 7, 
at 1055 ("It may be not merely the strengthening of deviant bonds within prison that leads 
to increased criminality, but also the weakening of social bonds with family and commu-
nity on the outside."). 
19. See Fagan & Meares, supra note 6, at 203 ("The assignment of a criminal record 
places concrete and lasting barriers to future employment, and for former inmates, re-
duces their choices with respect to avoiding crime and entering positive social roles."); 
James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal 
Records, 11 N.Y.U.J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 177, 178-79 (2008) ("Persons stigmatized with a 
criminal label face de jure and de facto discrimination in employment, housing, and ac-
cess to government social welfare benefits."); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Rec-
ord, 108 Am. J. Soc. 937, 961 (2003) ("The fact that a criminal record severely limits em-
ployment opportunities ... suggests that these individuals are left with few viable alterna-
tives [to crime]."); Pritikin, supra note 7, at 1061-63 (identifying various ways in which 
incarceration can reduce employment opportunities). 
20. Fagan & Meares, supra note 6, at 209 (citing Jeremy Travis, But They All Come 
Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry 166 (2005) ). 
21. Pritikin, supra note 7, at 1066-67. 
22. Fagan & Meares, supra note 6, at 205 (citing Robert]. Sampson &John H. Laub, 
Urban Poverty and the Family Context of Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Pro-
cess in a Classic Study, 65 Child Dev. 523,531-33,538-39 (1994)). 
23. Pritikin, supra note 7, at 1065-66. 
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where former inmates are concentrated.24 Thus, incarceration is not 
merely a consequence of neighborhood crime, but also a critical piece of 
the "ecological dynamics of neighborhoods that may actually elevate 
crime."25 
Yet despite the rich scholarly literature on the sociological, psycho-
logical, and economic impacts of criminalization and incarceration and 
their criminogenic effects, one important dynamic has been overlooked. 
Scholars have observed that efforts to restrict the supply of illegal goods 
(like drugs) tend to raise the price of those goods. As prices rise, crimi-
nals have greater incentive to engage in the illegal activity and to utilize 
violence to maintain their market position.26 Criminalization, however, 
does more than simply create imperfect markets that reward illegal be-
havior. Sometimes criminalization creates second-order criminal mar-
kets-new criminal opportunities that would not exist but for the crimi-
nalization of the initial antisocial activity. 
This dynamic is critically important. First, it suggests the possibility 
that legislators and law enforcement grossly underestimate the social 
costs of criminalizing some activities. Second, and more importantly, 
close examination of the relationship between first- and second-order 
criminal markets suggests that lawmakers and law enforcement officials 
must be cautious in their responses to second-order crimes. Otherwise, in 
their effort to combat the second-order crime, policymakers may unwit-
tingly improve the market for the original crime, thereby raising law en-
forcement costs and increasing the level of the very activity they initially 
sought to suppress. 
This Part proceeds as follows. Part LA describes two ways in which 
first-order crimes generate new criminal activities. First, the criminaliza-
tion of a good or activity can create demand for new harmful goods and 
services.27 Second, the criminalization of a good or activity creates new 
24. See Fagan & Meares, supra note 6, at 205-06 (discussing how "high incarceration 
levels affect the ... economic circumstances of Mrican-American communities"); Fagan et 
a!., supra note 16, at 1552-53 (describing how high rates of incarceration can undermine 
local social and economic stability, thereby contributing to rise in crime). 
25. Fagan eta!., supra note 16, at 1553. 
26. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons 
from Economics, 1994 U. Chi. Legal F. 207, 223-24 (contending that drug dealers' incen-
tive to use violence increases with drug prices); Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves 
from the Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-First Century, 33 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 235, 252 
(2000) ("Indeed, enforcement may increase the profits for many of these drug traffickers 
and may, as it often does, operate to increase the levels of violence."). The increase in the 
price of drugs resulting from criminalization may also lead to an increase in property 
crimes as drug users seek to fund their addiction through more crime. See Shawn Bushway 
& Peter Reuter, Economists' Contribution to the Study of Crime and the Criminal Justice 
System, 37 Crime &Just. 389, 425 (2008) (noting dependent users commit crimes to fund 
drug purchases). 
27. As discussed below, this increased demand for secondary antisocial goods and ser-
vices is distinct from the increased demand for substitute criminal goods and services that 
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opportunities for harmful behavior by foreclosing the government from 
using regulatory tools that might prevent the new activity from occurring. 
Part I.B then describes how the new activities generated by first-order 
criminalization impose independent costs on society that tend to trigger 
a second wave of criminalization. 
A. Creating Second-Order Crimes 
Second-order crimes are the product of two unfortunate conse-
quences of criminalizing first-order antisocial conduct. First, the Climi-
nalization of a first-order activity can create demand for new types of 
goods and services that impose their own costs on society. For example, 
by criminalizing unauthorized entry across U.S. borders, Congress cre-
ated demand for human smuggling services. Second, criminalization can 
create the opportunity for second-order crimes by pushing the undesira-
ble activity underground, where the government is unable to use regula-
tory tools that might prevent the crime from occurring. The combination 
of these two effects serves to multiply the growth of the criminal law as 
the symptoms of criminalization lead to more criminalization-expand-
ing criminal codes, contributing to the complexity of sentencing guide-
lines, and, perversely, adding to the enforcement costs associated with 
preventing the initial first-order crime. 
1. Creating Demand for Criminal Markets. - It is not easy to eliminate 
crime. The threat of criminal penalties will be sufficient to deflect some 
people toward legal options. Others will be deterred, not by the fear of 
criminal sanctions, but because they simply do not want to break the law. 
In this respect, the criminal law does not simply increase the cost of con-
sumption; it shapes consumer preferences and effectively devalues the 
criminalized conduct.28 However, while criminalization will tend to re-
duce the prevalence of an undesirable activity,29 it will rarely be sufficient 
to eradicate that activity entirely.30 In fact, while criminalization may de-
ter some consumers from participating in a socially undesirable activity, it 
results when criminals shift their criminal behavior in response to changes in the relative 
cost of pursuing a particular kind of criminal activity. See infra Part I.A. I. For an in-depth 
discussion of the "substitution effect" and crime, see generally Katyal, supra note 12. 
28. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke LJ. 1, 2 ("[I]n addition to creating disincentives for 
criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote various social norms of in-
dividual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the population at large."). 
29. But see Katyal, supra note 12, at 2435 (proposing circumstances in which crimi-
nalization or increased penalties may actually increase incidence of illegal activity). 
30. In fact, given the exorbitant enforcement costs associated with erasing the last 
vestiges of crime, in most cases the complete elimination of the activity will be economi-
cally inefficient even if we assume it is practically possible. See Becker, supra note 5, at 170 
(suggesting optimal level of deterrence would "permit" certain number of offenses and 
leave certain number of offenders unpunished). 
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can also generate demand for goods and services that lead to the for-
mation of new criminal markets. 
Criminalization increases the price of an illegal good in two ways. 
First, it adds the expected cost of punishment to the price of the crimi-
nalized good. For example, assume the penalty for possession of a small 
quantity of marijuana were a $100 fine and there were a five percent 
chance of detection. If it cost $10 to purchase a bag of marijuana, then 
criminalization would raise the total expected cost of consumption to 
$15.31 Criminalization also raises the price of illegal consumption by 
eliminating legal avenues to obtain the good. Consumers must expend 
additional resources to find and safely access criminal markets. For ex-
ample, criminalizing unauthorized entry into the United States made it 
more difficult for undocumented individuals to cross the border. While it 
is relatively inexpensive for individuals to drive through legal check-
points, it is far more expensive to avoid the authorities and enter via re-
mote routes that are physically dangerous and require considerably more 
planning and supplies. 
A rise in the price of an illegal good resulting from criminalization is 
generally considered a good thing-this is how the criminal law is typi-
cally understood to deter antisocial behavior.32 However, the rise in 
prices and the elimination of legal avenues of access also creates the op-
portunity for entrepreneurs to offer services or goods that facilitate the 
cheap and successful completion of the crime. These might be services 
which lower the risk of detection (like radar detectors) or services that 
directly facilitate the commission of the crime (like human smuggling). 
The secondary market may not always impose new social costs. The im-
position of a speed limit gave rise to a rich market in radar detection 
technology. However, while radar detectors may hamper the effort to 
lower the social costs of speeding, radar detectors do not impose their 
own independent costs on society.33 Unfortunately, this is not true for 
every secondary criminal market. In many instances, the new activity car-
ries its own social costs, separate and apart from its effect on the first-
order criminal market. As discussed below, the smuggling of illegal aliens 
not only frustrates government efforts to keep the border closed, it can 
also increase the risk that would-be immigrants will die.34 The political 
31. $10 + ($100)(.05) = $15. This calculation, of course, assumes for simplicity's sake 
that there are no costs associated with marijuana possession other than the actual fine of 
$100. 
32. See Becker, supra note 5, at 176 (discussing relationship between cost and benefit 
of crime and its rate of incidence). But see Dau-Schmidt, supra note 28, at 2 (suggesting 
criminal law deters by shaping preferences). 
33. See Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer, Comment, Busting the "Fuzzbuster": Rethinking 
Bans on Radar Detectors, 94 Dick. L. Rev. 783, 797 (1990) (discussing national study con-
cluding radar detectors do not diminish highway safety). 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing cost~ imposed on first-order 
criminal market by second-order crime of smuggling undocumented immigrants). 
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response to such independent costs is often to criminalize the secondary 
activity.35 It is this second wave of criminalization that can perversely im-
prove the market for a crime the legislature originally tried to prohibit. 
Creating demand for secondary goods and services is not the only 
way that criminalization generates new criminal markets. Criminalization 
can also engender second-order crimes by eliminating barriers that pre-
vent secondary criminal markets from forming in the first place. 
2. The CTiminogenic Effect of DeTegulating Criminal Markets. - Criminal-
ization is often described as a form of regulation.36 In some cases, crimi-
nal and civil penalties work side by side, overlapping and complementing 
each other's efforts. Securities markets are governed not only by civil 
regulations but by the criminal law as well. When Bernie Madoff commit-
ted the largest fraud in U.S. history, he violated both civil and criminal 
statutesY However, the opposite may also be true-often the criminal 
law deregulates by pushing markets underground, beyond the reach of 
traditional civil regulatory tools. 38 In many respects, criminalization rep-
resents a policy choice to eschew other methods of controlling antisocial 
behavior.39 By eliminating other regulatory options, criminalization can 
create the space for the development of secondary criminal markets-
markets that might have difficulty forming in actively regulated indus-
tries.40 
35. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing widespread criminal-
ization of HIV-aware prostitution as example of second-order criminalization). 
36. E.g., Nicola Lacey, Criminalization as Regulation: The Role of Criminal Law, in 
Regulating Law 144 (Christine Parker eta!. eds., 2004); see also Peter Reuter, The Organi-
zation of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis 17 (1985) [hereinafter Reuter, Illegal 
Markets] ("All illegal businesses, like most legal business in contemporary America, are 
subject to regulation by government authority. For illegal businesses, the regulators are 
the police."); AdamS. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1385, 1406-10 (2011) (describing prosecutors as regulators). 
37. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. Times, 
June 30, 2009, at Al (noting criminal penalties in Madoff trial and simultaneous civil en-
forcement). 
38. See, e.g., Amanda Durney, Comment, The Sex Worker's Dilemma: Keeping 
Cambodia's Sex Trafficking Law from Negating the Successes of the 100% Condom Use 
Program, 16 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 215, 241 (2009) ("By criminalizing solicitation of 
prostitution, the Cambodian government has essentially deregulated the industry."). 
39. See infra Part III (comparing criminalization with regulatory approaches to anti-
social behavior). The difficulty of regulating criminalized markets is amplified by concerns 
that the regulation of antisocial behavior will be perceived as tacit social acceptance of that 
activity. See infra Part III.C (discussing relationship of criminalization to social norms). 
40. This is not to suggest that active regulation will always prevent criminal markets 
from forming. The regulation of the pharmaceutical industry has not entirely eliminated 
the problem of fake prescription drugs. See, e.g., Counterfeit Version of Avastin in U.S. 
Distribution, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 14, 2012), http:/ /www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
DrugSafety/ucm291960.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated July 10, 
2012) (warning of illegal sales of counterfeit pharmaceutical drug). In fact, the penalty 
enhancement for causing serious bodily harm or death in the trafficking of counterfeit 
goods is another example of a crime that resolves a source of inefficiency in a related crim-
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Take the sale of fake illegal drugs. While the legal pharmaceutical 
market is subject to strict licensing, labeling, and inspection require-
ments, the illegal drug market is unfettered by such restrictions. Drug 
dealers, unlike legitimate pharmaceutical manufacturers, are not subject 
to surprise visits by FDA inspectors. Similarly, the tiny plastic glassine 
bags that typify drug packaging on the street41 are not labeled with the 
drugs' active ingredients. Criminalizing and thus deregulating the drug 
trade makes it far easier for dealers to sell fake drugs to unsuspecting 
customers.42 The criminalization of real drugs thus gives rise to a new 
criminal opportunity and a secondary market-the sale of fake illegal 
drugs.43 
Unlike the secondary markets that develop in response to the de-
mand created by criminalization, markets that form in response to crim-
inal deregulation do not necessarily increase the incidence of the first-
order crime. While radar detectors lead to more speeding and human 
smuggling44 leads to an increase in illegal immigration, sales of fake co-
caine, made possible by the deregulatory effect of criminalizing drugs, do 
not increase the number of real cocaine sales. However, regardless of 
their origin, many second-order crimes impose costs on society that are 
wholly independent of their impact on the incidence of the original 
ina) market. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (describing effect of criminal-
ization of sales of counterfeit drugs). 
41. See Jennifer Slosar, Committee Okays Ban on Tiny Plastic Bags, Chi-Town Daily 
News (Mar. 5, 2008, 8:03 AM), http:/ /www.chitowndailynews.org/Chicago_news/ 
Committee_okays_ban_on_tiny_plastic_bags,12559 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing Chicago ordinance banning sale of plastic baggies that typify small-scale drug 
transactions). 
42. The sale of fake drugs does not appear to be limited to the occasional street cor-
ner transaction. In February 2011, a large-scale drug ring attempted to sell a New York City 
gang $16,000 of fake cocaine made up of baking soda and crushed sheetrock. Selim Algar, 
It's Off the "Wall": Sheetrock Cocaine, N.Y. Post, Feb. 4, 2011, at 22. In 2008, a multi-
agency "East End Drug Task Force" on Long Island recovered two kilograms of fake co-
caine along with an Uzi submachine gun. Luis Perez, Cops Bust Two Separate Cocaine 
Rings, Newsday (Long Island, N.Y.),July 30,2008, atA25. 
43. See David Simon & Edward Burns, The Corner: A Year in the Life of an Inner-
City Neighborhood 69 (1997) (describing "true hucksters" who "sell steakless sizzle" by 
selling users adulterated heroin cut with lactose and quinine or outright defrauding them 
by substituting baking soda for heroin, oregano for marijuana, and even battery acid for 
crack cocaine); see also P. Reuter & J.P. Caulkins, Illegal "Lemons": Price Dispersion in 
Cocaine and Heroin Markets, 56 Bull. on Narcotics 141, 160 (2004) [hereinafter Reuter & 
Caulkins, Illegal Lemons] (noting that some drug sellers may "specialize in fraud"). 
44. Here, human smuggling refers to individuals who facilitate illegal entry into the 
United States. They are often referred to as "snakeheads" or "coyotes," depending on the 
country of origin. Ian Peck, Note, Removing the Venom from the Snakehead: Japan's 
Newest Attempt To Control Chinese Human Smuggling, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1041, 
1043 ( 1998). This type of human smuggling should be distinguished from that of human 
traffickers who deal in the market for human slavery. See Developments in the Law-Jobs 
and Borders, l18 Harv. L. Rev. 2171, 2184 (2005) (quoting U.N. definition of human 
trafficking). 
2012] PERFECTING CRIMINAL MARKET'S 1959 
crime. It is often these independent costs that induce legislators to en-
gage in a second round of criminalization. 
B. The Independent Costs of Second-Order Crimes 
Consider again the fake illegal drug market. A drug user who pur-
chases fake drugs cannot go to the authorities for legal redress.45 Without 
legal recourse, such buyers are apt to resort to self-help measures that 
can involve violent, even deadly, assault.46 While the prospect of violent 
retribution may deter many drug sellers from offering fake products, 
other sellers accept this risk.47 The violent self-help response that follows 
the sale of fake illegal drugs imposes its own costs on society, independ-
ent of the market for real drugs. Some might question whether society 
should care about violence inflicted upon a dealer of "fake drugs." Put 
another way, some would debate whether a proper measure of social util-
ity should include the utility lost by a criminal harmed in retribution for 
his shady dealings.48 However, given the impact of neighborhood vio-
lence on third parties-including the danger of innocent-bystander inju-
ries, increased fear in the community, and other "broken windows ef-
fects"49-one need not be concerned with the costs imposed on the crim-
inals themselves to conclude that fake illegal drug sales impose costs on 
society as a whole. 
Like the market for fake drugs, the human smuggling market entails 
costs that are independent from its impact on the number of immigrants 
who illegally cross the border. In an effort to avoid detection and maxim-
ize profits, smugglers ship their human cargo in squalid conditions that 
can be hazardous and even deadly. In May 2003, nineteen illegal immi-
45. See Bob Ross, Drug Suspect Really Selling Sheetrock, Times-Picayune (New 
Orleans), May 25, 1989, at B-3 (reporting police officer's view that fake drug sales create 
danger that sellers will be "hurt or killed by an angry buyer" because '" [a]fter all, who is 
going to call the police and complain that the man they were buying cocaine from didn't 
sell them the real thing'"). 
46. Simon & Burns, supra note 43, at 69 (describing how sellers offake drugs face vi-
olent retribution from defrauded customers as well as other dealers who sell real drugs); 
see also Jonathan Eig, Dealing Fake Crack a Risky Business, Times-Picayune (New 
Orleans), Aug. 27, 1989, at A-1 (attributing rash of drive-by shootings to rise of phony drug 
sales); 2 Teens Charged in Stabbing Death, Syracuse Post-Standard, July 6, 2008, at B-8 
(reporting alleged murder over sale offake cocaine). 
47. While interning for The Defender Service in Seattle in the summer after my se-
cond year of law school, I represented just such a dealer. The prosecutor remarked that 
my client was "lucky to have sold to an undercover officer" rather than a potentially violent 
user. 
48. This is arguably distinct from the question whether or not the positive utility de-
rived by the criminal as a result of his crime should be included in the calculation of the 
socially optimal level of crime. See Harold Winter, The Economics of Crime: An Introduc-
tion to Rational Crime Analysis 4-6 (2008). 
49. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1982, at 29 (explaining "broken win-
dows" theory of crime) . 
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grants suffocated to death in the back of a smuggler's truck when the 
temperature inside his sealed tractor-trailer reached 173 degrees.50 In 
January 2000, fifteen badly dehydrated Chinese immigrants were discov-
ered crammed into a metal freight container in a Seattle port.51 Three 
dead bodies were discovered decomposing in the rear of the container 
amid the garbage and human waste that had accumulated during their 
fifteen-day voyage from China. 52 Officials concluded that the deaths were 
the result of either exposure to the cold in the unheated container, lack 
of water, or a combination of the two.53 These human tragedies illustrate 
the considerable cost human smuggling exacts on society, independent 
of its effect on the number of illegal immigrants who gain access to the 
United States. 
The independent costs associated with second-order ~rimes like 
human smuggling or the sale of fake illegal drugs trigger a predictable 
legislative response-a second wave of criminalization and enhanced 
penalties. More than thirty-five state legislatures have criminalized the 
sale offake illegal drugs.54 Similarly, in 1994, Congress passed the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which increased the maximum 
term of imprisonment for alien smuggling to twenty years if the smuggler 
either causes a person serious bodily injury or places the life of any per-
son in jeopardy. 55 Under the Act, a smuggler who causes the death of any 
person is eligible for the death penalty or life imprisonment. 56 
It is hardly surprising that legislatures would respond to the prob-
lems produced by criminalization with more criminalization. Scholars 
have long observed that the criminal law seems to act as a "one-way 
ratchet"57 perpetually expanding its scope and enhancing its penalties.58 
Increased criminalization would appear to be a reasonable response to 
50. Susan Carroll, Trucker Gets 34 Years in Trailer Deaths, Hous. Chron., Jan. 25, 
2011, at B2. 
51. Sam Howe Verhovek, Deadly Choice of Stowaways: Ship Containers, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 12, 2000, at A1; see also Cleo Kung, Comment, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human 
Smuggling from China and the 1996 Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of "Ref-
ugee," 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1271, 1283 (2000) (discussing same incident). 
52. Verhovek, supra note 51. 
53. Id. 
54. See supra note 1 (collecting state statutes). 
55. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60024(l)(G), 108 Stat. 1796, 1981-82 (1994) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (B)). 
56. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 
703, 719 (2005) ("To begin with, the escalation of 'law and order' politics in recent years 
has created a one-way ratchet in U.S. governance, churning out an ever-increasing number 
of crimes and severity of punishments."); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 547 ("[L]egislators will 
tend to see criminal law as a one-way ratchet."). 
58. See David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection 
and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 Ind. LJ. 1445, 1448 (2010) (describing "ever-
expanding nature of the criminal law"). 
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the significant and even tragic independent costs associated with many 
second-order crimes. If the logic of deterrence was persuasive for the 
first-order crime, why should it not apply to the second-order crimes as 
well? Unfortunately, criminalization in these circumstances is a double-
edged sword. While second-order crimes impose costs on society as a 
whole, they also create imperfections in the first-order criminal market. 
The result is that legislatures face a difficult paradox. They can combat 
the second-order harms with a new wave of criminalization, but, in doing 
so, they risk improving the first-order criminal market that they originally 
sought to eliminate. In effect, by criminalizing the secondary harm, they 
help perfect the original criminal market. 
II. PERFECTING CRIMINAL MARKETS 
To understand how lawmakers inadvertently perfect criminal mar-
kets, one must appreciate the ways in which second-order crimes pro-
mote first-order market failures. 59 There is a certain incongruity in de-
scribing the failure of a criminal market. In a sense, one might expect a 
perfectly efficient criminal market to internalize the ill effects of the 
criminalized good or activity and thus naturally produce zero crime. 60 
However, for purposes of this Article, it is more useful to momentarily set 
aside the fact that crimes are, on the whole, harmful to society, and in-
stead think of markets for crime as no different from markets for legal 
goods and services. A perfect market for crime61-like a perfect market 
for toasters, computers, or the imaginary widget-is thus one in which 
supply meets demand and the marginal cost of producing the good or 
service is equal to the price charged to the consumer.62 Critically, while 
the failure of an ordinary market involves an inefficient use of resources 
and a net loss to society, a criminal market failure generally leads to an 
underproduction of crime-a net gain. Thus, while policymakers gener-
59. As economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson suggested, market failures 
simply describe markets that "do not always lead to the most efficient outcome." Paul A. 
Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, Economics 30 (19th ed. 2010). An efficient outcome, 
in turn, can be defined as the "most effective use of a society's resources in satisfYing peo-
ple's wants and needs." Id. at 4. 
60. In fact, even in an idealized (completely efficient) criminal market, the optimal 
quantity of crime would likely be greater than zero. This is because some crimes, such as 
stealing a small quantity of food to save a life, or speeding to get a pregnant mother to the 
hospital on time, will likely be "value maximizing." Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 
supra note 5, § 7.2, at 280. 
61. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 553,554 (1999) ("The tools ofmicroeconomic theory-the curves of 
supply and demand-can be applied to analyze the market of children for adoption, the 
market of crimes, or the market of laws in general, as they are applied to the market of 
apples or cars."). 
62. This also suggests a perfectly competitive market in which suppliers are price tak-
ers. Otherwise, the marginal cost of production would not equal the price for consumers. 
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ally seek to minimize market failure in the legal economy, one would ex-
pect them to promote failure in criminal markets. 
This Part proceeds as follows. Part II.A examines three mechanisms 
by which second-order crimes can weaken first-order criminal markets. 
First, second-order crimes can create asymmetries of information that 
undermine first-order criminal markets. Second, second-order crimes 
can impose new costs on first-order criminal activity. Finally, second-
order crimes can reduce competition in first-order criminal markets. Part 
II.B then identifies how efforts to fight second-order antisocial activity 
through criminalization can strengthen first-order criminal markets. 
A. How Second-Order Crimes Promote Market Failure, Impose Costs, and Generate 
Weakness in First-Order Criminal Markets 
By their nature, second-order crimes are intimately connected to 
first-order criminal markets. As a result, second-order crimes can exact 
costs that weaken demand and promote market failure in first-order 
criminal markets. They do so by creating the very same conditions that 
lead to weakness or failure in ordinary markets-they eliminate competi-
tion, exploit information asymmetries, and introduce new types of risks 
and costs into the first-order market. 
1. Criminal Exploitation of Asymmetric Information. - In his 1970 arti-
cle, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
George Akerlof demonstrated how asymmetric information can lead to 
market failure by describing a used automobile market in which buyers 
cannot distinguish between good cars and "lemons."63 Akerlof explained 
that the seller of a used car possesses greater information about the car's 
quality than potential buyers.64 Unable to distinguish between good cars 
and "lemons," buyers refuse to offer full price for cars that might not be 
of high quality. Sellers, in turn, refuse to sell good cars for less than their 
full value, so the only cars offered for sale are likely to be low-value lem-
ons. The result is a downward spiral of lower prices and lower quality, as 
the asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers causes the "bad 
cars to drive out the good."65 
When asymmetric information threatens legitimate markets, the 
government is often willing to intervene to prevent inefficiency or mar-
63. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 QJ. Econ. 488, 489-90 (1970); see also Bruce Mann & Thomas J. 
Holdych, When Lemons Are Better than Lemonade: The Case Against Mandatory Used 
Car Warranties, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. I, 2 (1996) ("Informational asymmetry arises when 
one party to a bargain, usually the seller, has more and better information about the con-
dition of a product than does the buyer."). 
64. See Akerlof, supra note 63, at 490 ("[B]ad cars sell at the same price as good cars 
since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bar car; only 
the seller knows."). 
65. Id. 
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ket failure. Mandatory labeling requirements and government factory 
inspections build consumers' confidence that they are getting what they 
believe they have paid for. 66 State consumer protection laws, such as 
"lemon laws" that govern automobile markets, diminish the risk that 
buyers will overpay for defective products.67 Notably, such regulation 
seiVes the interests of both buyers and sellers: Without some inteiVention 
to correct the problems created by asymmetric information, the market 
could fail altogether, to the detriment of all parties.68 Indeed, there are 
occasions when overt government inteiVention may not even be re-
quired. In some circumstances, sellers will be sufficiently motivated to 
privately initiate measures to counter the ill effects of asymmetric infor-
mation. For example, even without lemon laws, car dealers may offer 
warranties to reassure buyers that they are not being swindled.69 Yet even 
private measures, such as a voluntary seller warranty, require the backing 
of a legal system to be effective. When asymmetries of information cause 
a failure in a criminal market, they are far more difficult to resolve. 
Criminal markets are particularly likely to involve information 
asymmetry. Government inteiVentions that help ensure quality in mar-
kets for legal goods and services, such as labeling requirements and the 
promise of frequent government inspections, are not available in black 
markets. Moreover, private enforcement through the legal system is not 
an option for criminal market participants.70 A defrauded purchaser of 
heroin, for example, cannot simply take his dealer to small claims court 
or report him to the police for fraud. 71 The characteristics of criminal 
transactions-primarily the need to avoid detection by law enforce-
ment-also inhibit the flow of information. While puiVeyors of legal 
goods and services can use advertising to inform their customers about 
66. See Douglas C. Michael, Self-Regulation for Safety and Security: Final Minutes or 
Finest Hour?, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1075, 1105 (2006) (describing importance of labeling 
and inspection to maintaining consumer confidence). 
67. Patrick]. Glen, Law as Asymmetric Information: Theory, Application, and Results 
in the Context of Foreign Direct Investment in Real Estate, 8 Berkeley Bus. LJ., no. I, 
2011, at 116, 122 ("These laws do not eliminate the potentialities of asymmetric infor-
mation, but, rather, provide recourse to a buyer if he happens to buy a 'lemon' rather 
than a good car."). 
68. See Kabir Masson, Note, Paradox of Presumptions: Seller Warranties and Reli-
ance Waivers in Commercial Contracts, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 507 (2009) ("Seller war-
ranties are a common feature of commercial contracts because they are often in the inter-
ests of both the buyer and the seller."). But see Mann & Holdych, supra note 63, at 3 (ob-
serving that incomplete information may prevent market forces from generating efficient 
warranty terms). 
69. See Mann & Holdych, supra note 63, at 26 (describing how warranties in private 
marketplaces exist to combat lemons problem). 
70. See Bovard v. Am. Horse Enters., Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (Ct. App. 1988) 
("Whenever a court becomes aware that a contract is illegal, it has a duty to refrain from 
entertaining an action to enforce the contract."). 
71. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing societal costs of self-
help redress for fraudulent black market transactions). 
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the quality of their offerings,72 black market sellers must weigh the eco-
nomic benefit of advertising against the risk of attracting the attention of 
law enforcement. Advertising for illegal goods not only raises the risk of 
detection-in some cases it can be used as evidence of guilt in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution.73 
The difficulty of eliminating asymmetries of information in criminal 
markets does not necessarily mean that criminal markets are prone to fail 
altogether. While criminal markets have limited legal avenues to correct 
for asymmetric information, other methods exist to deter individuals 
from exploiting such imbalances.74 For example, the threat of retributive 
violence may deter some individuals from taking advantage of asymmet-
ric information.75 Moreover, while a stranger may take advantage of an 
ignorant customer, repeat players have less incentive to exploit their in-
formational advantage.76 As a result, criminal markets may tend to rely 
more heavily on repeat relationships that foster trust between market 
participants.77 For this reason, it is possible that one's reputation as an 
honest businessperson may actually matter more in criminal markets 
than it does in the legitimate business world. Yet the ability to prevent 
some criminal exploitation of asymmetric information does not mean 
that information imbalances are not taxing criminal markets. Quite the 
opposite: By imposing additional costs on a criminal market, information 
asymmetries act as a tax on the crime itself. 
This tax takes two forms. First, efforts to eliminate information 
asymmetries-such as doing business only with acquaintances, exacting 
violent retribution on defrauders, and the like-can be costly. These ex-
penses increase the cost of committing crimes for criminals just as a lit-
eral tax would. Second, while strategies that rely on violent retribution, 
reputation, and doing business with repeat players may reduce the 
chances that a seller is ripping off his customers, they will not entirely 
72. Government intervention in the form of prohibitions against false advertising, 
such as those embodied in the Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. § ll25(a)(1)(B) (2006) (provid-
ing federal cause of action for false advertising), helps sellers counter problems of asym-
metric information by increasing consumer confidence in the truth of their statements. 
73. See, e.g., Helms v. State, 38 So. 3d 182, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting 
admission of sexually suggestive advertisement on Craigslist as evidence of defendant's 
intent to profit from prostitution). 
74. See Reuter & Caulkins, Illegal Lemons, supra note 43, at 159-61 (discussing il-
legal dnig market as "repeated game" between buyers and sellers). 
75. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing role of violence in main-
taining market position in illegal markets). 
76. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (rev. ed. 2006) 
(demonstrating benefits of adopting cooperative strategies in situations involving repeat 
players as well as long-term costs associated with cheating). 
77. See Reuter & Caulkins, Illegal Lemons, supra note 43, at 160 ("[O]ddly enough, 
... even among criminals, trust may be the critical factor."); see also Axelrod, supra note 
76, at 173-75 (explaining how "cooperation can get started, can thrive ... and can protect 
itself once established" in reciprocal environments). 
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eliminate cheating. In The Corner: A Year in the Life of an Inner-City Neigh-
borhood, David Simon and Edward Burns describe how some drug dealers 
regularly defraud their customers. 78 According to Simon and Burns, the 
dealers "stand where they want, sell what they want, and risk only the 
rage of their victims, or in a rare instance, the ire of a street dealer whose 
business or reputation suffers by proximity."79 As a result, buyers must 
internalize some risk that sellers are taking advantage of them. Buyers in 
criminal markets cannot entirely avoid the lemon problem.8° Faced with 
the possibility that sellers are taking advantage of them, buyers will lower 
the price they are willing to pay just as if there were a literal tax placed 
on their purchase.81 
Many second-order crimes involve the exploitation of asymmetric in-
formation in criminal markets. The sale of fake drugs, for example, takes 
advantage of the asymmetry of information between sellers (dealers) and 
buyers (users). 82 Other second-order crimes may involve less obvious 
forms of asymmetric information that still produce inefficiencies in the 
first-order criminal market. A "coyote" or "snakehead"83 who promises a 
would-be undocumented immigrant a safe voyage may have an incentive 
to misrepresent how safe his services are as well as the likelihood that 
their venture will succeed. Snakehead customers, who possess less infor-
mation than the smugglers themselves, are likely to demand a discount 
and may even refuse to participate in the market at all rather than accept 
the risk that the smuggler has misrepresented the quality of his services. 
Like drug dealers and used car salesmen, human smugglers may find that 
possessing superior knowledge of their operations and its attendant dan-
gers actually translates into fewer transactions and lower profits. 
2. Second-Order Crimes Can Impose Costs That Weaken First-Order Criminal 
Markets. - Guns are often regarded as "an essential tool of commerce" in 
illegal markets.84 In the absence of legal systems to resolve disputes, guns 
may be used by market participants to enforce contracts, guarantee phys-
ical safety, and ensure the quality of goods and services.85 Yet the use of 
78. Simon & Burns, supra note 43, at 69. 
79. ld. 
80. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing problem of "lemons" 
caused by asymmetric information in markets). 
81. According to Simon and Burns, honest sellers may also have to expend additional 
resources eliminating dishonest competitors who indirectly damage their reputation. See 
Simon & Bums, supra note 43, at 61 ("What was bad for business was hunted with avenge-
ance: ... burn artists were driven deep into the shadows."). 
82. See Reuter & Caulkins, Illegal Lemons, supra note 43, at 160 (examining varia-
tion in drug quality and implications of"lemon effect" in drug markets). 
83. See Peck, supra note 44, at 1043 (describing "ominous nicknames" for human 
smugglers). 
84. Lance Lindeen, Keep Off The Grass!: An Alternative Approach to the Gun Con-
trol Debate, 85 Ind. LJ. 1659, 1688 (2010). 
85. See id. at 1687-88 (discussing how drug prohibition and enforcement lead to in-
creased violence); see also Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visi-
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gun violence (or the threat of gun violence) in illegal markets as a substi-
tute for legal mechanisms of dispute resolution does not necessarily 
mean that guns improve the ability of illegal markets to function 
properly. In fact, gun possession and gun violence, like many second-
order crimes, can impose significant costs on first-order criminal mar-
kets.86 
As an initial matter, it is by no means assured that guns are needed 
for illegal markets to function. Instead, gun possession may present mar-
ket participants with a prisoner's dilemma-a situation in which partici-
pants would prefer a world where no one carries a gun to a world where 
everyone carries a gun.87 However, because coordination is difficult and 
each participant cannot afford to be the only one who isn't "packing," all 
participants may be forced to arm themselves.88 As a result, the fact that 
illegal market participants tend to rely heavily on guns does not prove 
that the existence of guns lowers the cost of conducting illegal business. 
Moreover, gun possession almost certainly imposes significant costs 
on criminal activity. Drug dealers, aware that the presence of guns in-
creases their chance of being injured or killed, have to be compensated 
for the risks that they take.89 This additional compensation is often de-
scribed as a "risk premium."90 The need to pay dealers a risk premium 
ble Hand 132-50 (1983) [hereinafter Reuter, Disorganized Crime] (describing role of 
violence in illegal markets); Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition: vVhat 
Difference Does Legalization Make?, 15 Whittier L. Rev. 613, 618-19 (1994) ("[T]he use 
of force and intimidation is an integral part of the supply of illicit goods."); Johan David 
Michels, Keeping Dealers off the Docket: The Perils of Prosecuting Serious Drug-Related 
Offences at the International Criminal Court, 21 Fla. J. Int'l L. 449, 453 (2009) (suggest-
ing drug trade is violent because "the ordinary ultimate forum of conflict resolution for 
regular businesses is unavailable to drug traffickers"). 
86. Strictly speaking, adding such costs does not mean that the first-order criminal 
market is inefficient. Indeed, it is often the failure of market participants to properly in-
ternalize the true costs (or benefits) of their actions that produces inefficiency. Samuelson 
& Nordhaus, supra note 59, at 36. Thus, rather than describe the imposition of new costs 
as causing the first-order criminal market to "fail," it is more accurate to say that the se-
cond-order crime "weakens" the first-order market. 
87. See Axelrod, supra note 76, at 7-9 (explaining that game theorists use "prisoner's 
dilemma" to model situations in which "what is best for each person individually leads to 
mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off with mutual coopera-
tion"). 
88. See generally Robert Taylor, A Game Theoretic Model of Gun Control, 15 Int'l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 269 (1995) (applying game theory to behavior of criminals and victims 
under gun control laws). 
89. Some economists estimate that compensation for the risk of physical injury and 
death accounts for as much as thirty-three percent of the cost of cocaine, while the ex-
pense of importing the drug into the country accounts for only twelve percent of its price. 
Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Illicit Drug Markets and Economic Irregularities, 40 
Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 1, 10 (2006). 
90. Juan R. Torruella, The "War on Drugs": One Judge's Attempt at a Rational Dis-
cussion, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 235, 263 n.l32 (1997) (suggesting poor individuals are paid 
"risk premium" for engaging in drug trade); see also Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. 
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will shift the supply curve to the left, raising the price of drugs and reduc-
ing the total quantity of drug crimes committed. To the extent that buy-
ers are also threatened by the proliferation of guns,91 the demand curve 
will be shifted to the left as well, resulting in a further decrease in drug 
crimesY2 As discussed below, laws that enhance the penalties for pos-
sessing a firearm while engaging in drug-related activities may well be 
justified by society's interest in reducing gun violence.93 However, the 
same enhancements may also lower the costs of engaging in the first-or-
der criminal drug market. 
Some second-order crimes, like the smuggling of illegal aliens,94 un-
deniably increase the total quantity of first-order crimes committed. Yet 
even these second-order crimes can impose costs on the first-order mar-
ket that complicate criminalization efforts. As described above, there are 
enormous risks associated with using the services of a human smuggler. 
When smugglers fail to take sufficient precautions to protect their cus-
tomers, it is the would-be immigrants who pay the sometimes fatal 
price.95 While tragic, the risks associated with utilizing the services of a 
human smuggler also have the effect of raising the expected cost of at-
tempting to enter the country illegally (the first-order crime). Thus even 
those second-order offenses that are essential to the commission of a 
first-order crime entail costs that have deterrent value. This complex re-
lationship between first- and second-order crimes greatly complicates 
efforts to regulate antisocial behavior with the criminal law. 
3. Second-Order Crimes Can Weaken Competition in First-Order Criminal 
Markets. - The basic criticism of imperfectly competitive markets is that 
such markets (usually) fail to allocate resources efficiently by producing 
less than the optimal amount of a given good.96 The result is a net loss to 
Dubner, Freakonomics 97 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006) (describing street dealer's insist-
ence that he receive more money from his boss during period of increased violence due to 
drug war); Reuter & Caulkins, Illegal Lemons, supra note 43, at 144 n.* (suggesting high 
drug prices reflect, in part, substantial risk that seller will be victimized by other market 
participants). 
91. Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-
Selling Gang's Finances, 115 QJ. Econ. 755, 777 (2000) ("Customers are afraid to come 
purchase drugs, as evidenced by the following observation by a gang officer: 'Ain't no way 
nobody gonna come 'round here looking for their rock [crack] if they know they gonna 
get shot .... "'). 
92. In their study of drug finances, Levitt and Venkatesh observed that the average 
price for drugs fell significantly (even below marginal cost) during periods of escalated 
violence due to gang warfare over drug territory. ld. 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 130-132 (discussing effect of criminalization 
of second-order gun-related crimes on first-order criminal market). 
94. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 529.100 (LexisNexis 2008) (establishing felony liability 
for "human trafficking"). 
95. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (describing deadly incidents of hu-
man smuggling). 
96. Of course, like every statement in economics, the claim that imperfect markets 
lead to inefficient allocation of resources is based upon certain assumptions. According to 
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society that is often referred to as "deadweight loss."97 Imperfectly com-
petitive criminal markets are more difficult to evaluate. On the one 
hand, imperfect criminal markets in which sellers possess pricing power 
likely underproduce crime.98 Given the negative impact of crime on so-
cial welfare, this would suggest that an imperfect criminal market is pref-
erable to a perfectly competitive one. Similarly, some have suggested that 
criminal monopolists and cartels have both the incentive and the ability 
to impose a certain level of discipline over criminal activities that is good 
both for business and for society as a wholeY9 For example, centralized 
criminal enterprises may recognize that the sale of drugs to children or 
the execution of witnesses during a freight hijacking can trigger undesir-
able police attention and a political backlash that impose substantial 
costs on their other criminal activities. 100 In this respect, the public is 
likely to prefer criminal activity in an imperfectly competitive market to 
less "organized" crime. 
Unfortunately, there are also significant costs associated with imper-
fect criminal markets. Because producers in imperfect markets make out-
sized profits, imperfect criminal markets are full of incentives for crimi-
nals to enter and fight for market position. 101 The negative externalities 
associated with the violent struggle for control of the market may well 
outweigh the benefits (or reduced costs) that flow from the under-
production of crime. 102 Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that in-
the theory of the "second best," it is possible that, in a world in which all markets are 
equally imperfect, resources can be allocated efficiently. See Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law, supra note 5, § 9.3, at 357 n.2. 
97. Samuelson & Nordhaus, supra note 59, at 200. 
98. See Bushway & Reuter, supra note 26, at 427 ("[I] n legal markets there is a well-
established doctrine that monopoly control or any suppression of competition hurts soci-
ety .... However, the state may actually find itself allied with cartel organizers in illegal 
markets, if that will result in higher prices and thus reduce the production of 'bads. "'); see 
also James M. Buchanan, A Defense of Organized Crime?, in The Economics of Crime and 
Punishment 119, 119 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1973) ("If monopoly in the supply of'goods' 
is socially undesirable, monopoly in the supply of 'bads' should be socially desirable, pre-
cisely because of the output restriction."). 
99. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Economics and Criminal Enterprise, Pub. Int., 
Spring 1967, at 61, 73 (arguing "organization" of criminal activity may reduce negative 
externalities). 
100. Id. 
101. See Bushway & Reuter, supra note 26, at 434 (noting prospect of monopoly 
power increases incentives to enter criminal markets); see also Levitt & Venkatesh, supra 
note 91, at 772-73 (describing drug market as "tournament" rewarding successful utiliza-
tion of violence); Abdala Mansour, Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, Gangs and Crime 
Deterrence, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 315, 319 (2006) (observing that reduced competition in 
criminal market may result in more violence because there are significant profits at stake). 
102. See Jonathan P. Caulkins, Peter Reuter & Lowell J. Taylor, Can Supply Re-
strictions Lower Price? Violence, Drug Dealing and Positional Advantage, 5 Contributions 
to Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, no. 1, art. 3, 2006, at 2, http:/ /www.degruyter.com/view/j/ 
bejeap.2005.5.issue-l/bejeap.2006.5.1.1387 /bejeap.2006.5.1.1387 .xml (on file with the 
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creased centralization will reduce the number of crimes committed. If 
centralization reduces the transaction costs associated with coordinating 
other criminal ventures, a reduction in the number of criminals (or crim-
inal organizations) might result in an increase in the total quantity of 
crimes committed. Criminal monopolies can impose other costs on soci-
ety as well. The successful commission of some crimes (such as some 
forms of extortion) may require significant resources available only to 
criminal enterprises of substantial size and strength. Similarly, criminal 
cartels and monopolies are in a better position to corrupt local law en-
forcement and other public officials. 103 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with certainty whether 
society is better off with a centralized, imperfectly competitive criminal 
market or one that is characterized by many small criminal organizations 
with little individual control over the total quantity of crime produced. 
However, the difficulty in ascertaining the costs and benefits of competi-
tion in criminal markets does not make criminal market structure irrele-
vant. The structure of a criminal market clearly has a significant impact 
on the level of harm inflicted upon society. Consequently, it is appropri-
ate to identify the impact that second-order crimes may have on the 
structure of criminal markets. 104 
The most obvious second-order crime affecting criminal market 
structure is the use of violence (often gun violence) to reduce competi-
tion in a first-order criminal market. 105 It is not uncommon for criminals 
to use guns and gun violence to suppress competition and increase their 
market power. 106 In their analysis of the finances of a drug-selling gang, 
economists Steven Levitt and Sudhir Venkatesh observed that a violent 
gang war can substantially increase the prevailing gang's influence over 
Columbia Law Review) (describing "socially counter-productive effect" of policies that raise 
drug prices and thus incentivize drug-related violence). 
103. See Schelling, supra note 99, at 66 (describing advantages of scale and ability of 
large firms to "cultivat[e] relations with the police"); id. at 77 (explaining monopolies' 
incentive to corrupt officials). 
104. One should not assume that all criminal markets are imperfect in an economic 
sense. In fact, evidence suggests that many criminal markets, in particular many local drug 
markets, are in fact highly competitive, and sellers often do not have significant influence 
over price. See Reuter & Caulkins, Illegal Lemons, supra note 43, at 147 n.* ("[I]llicit drug 
markets are rarely subject to monopoly or cartel arrangements [because] exclusion is too 
difficult."); see also Reuter, Illegal Markets, supra note 36, at x (concluding that economic 
and institutional constraints limit ability of criminal enterprises to restrain competition 
and establish dominance in many illegal markets). 
105. These are second-order crimes because the motivation for illegally possessing 
and using guns would not exist but for the criminal organization's interest in gaining mar-
ket position in the first-order criminal market. 
106. See Mansour et al., supra note 101, at 319 ("[C]riminal organizations can use 
violence to maintain their market power."); Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Original-
ism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 299, 310 (2010) (de-
scribing use of violent intimidation by street gangs to suppress competition in local drug 
markets). 
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the price of illegal drugs. They observed that the gang in their study was 
able to charge substantially higher prices for crack cocaine following a 
gang war that effectively doubled the area under their control.107 The use 
of violence to seize "drug turf," like other second-order crimes, imposes 
significant costs on society. It also, however, creates inefficiencies in the 
first-order drug market. The violent consolidation of the drug market 
raises drug prices and reduces the total quantity of drugs sold.108 
Policymakers thus face a difficult choice. By intervening to prevent 
the second-order crime of drug related violence, policymakers inadvert-
ently perfect the first-order illegal drug market-increasing its efficiency, 
lowering the price of illegal drugs, and, ultimately, increasing the quan-
tity of drugs sold. 
B. How the Criminalization of Second-Order Crimes Perfects First-Order Criminal 
Markets 
If second-order crimes can engender inefficiency and weakness in 
first-order criminal markets, it is not surprising that efforts to suppress 
second-order crimes can inadvertently bolster those first-order criminal 
markets. Indeed, it seems likely that policymakers "perfect" first-order 
criminal markets across a broad spectrum of illegal activity. From prosti-
tution to drug markets to back-alley abortions, second-order crimes cre-
ate problems for first-order criminal markets. By criminalizing related 
activities, policymakers inadvertently resolve information asymmetries, 
strengthen competition, and eliminate costs that hinder first-order crim-
inal markets. 
Lawmakers may rationally criminalize the sale of fake drugs to deter 
the violence that results when dealers defraud their customers. 109 How-
ever, in doing so, they also reduce the asymmetry of information between 
dealers and buyers that weakens the genuine illicit drug market. Coun-
terfeit prescription drugs offer a related example. While they represent a 
107. Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 91, at 768; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Second 
Amendment Plumbing Mter Heller. Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-
Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 Urb. Law. 1, 13 (2009) 
("[E]thnographic research on gang crime concludes that gangs endeavor to organize drug 
markets in order to maximize the economic benefits of drug dealing while using the 
threat of violence to police competition."). 
108. As discussed, it is difficult to ultimately quantify the total impact of a rise in drug 
prices on total crime. Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for drugs like cocaine 
vary substantially. Some estimates suggest that demand is highly inelastic, while others 
indicate that demand is quite sensitive to changes in price. See Bushway & Reuter, supra 
note 26, at 429 ("[E]stimates for the price elasticity of the demand for cocaine vary be-
tween -0.6 and -2.5. "). Furthermore, even if a rise in prices substantially reduces drug con-
sumption, the total quantity of crimes in the community will not necessarily decline. Users 
may well commit additional property crimes to fund their addiction. As a result, while the 
number of drug sales might fall, the crime rate could rise. 
109. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing violent "self-help" 
countermeasures associated with fake drug sales). 
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very real health threat, 110 laws that enhance the penalties for serious inju-
ries or deaths resulting from trafficking in counterfeit goods actually in-
crease buyers' confidence that the counterfeit drugs they purchase will 
not harm them. 111 
Sometimes second-order criminalization can correct multiple first-
order market problems. With the exception of some counties in Nevada, 
prostitution is a crime everywhere in the United States. 112 Among the 
many problems associated with prostitution is the concem that "sex 
work" contributes to the spread of HIV I AIDS. 113 Notably, the criminaliza-
tion of prostitution is a good example of how first-order crimes can cre-
ate second-order problems by deregulating a market. By driving under-
ground an industry that might otherwise have been regulated to prevent 
the spread of communicable disease, the criminalization of prostitution 
created a secondary problem-the spread of HIV I AIDS through illegal 
sex work. 114 True to form, legislatures across the country have responded 
to this secondary problem with new statutes criminalizing prostitution 
with the knowledge that the defendant was aware that he or she had 
tested positive for HIV.115 
As discussed below, one might question whether the second-order 
crime, "HIV-aware prostitution," actually deters HIV-positive individuals 
110. See, e.g., Counterfeit Version of Avastin in U.S. Distribution, supra note 40 (de-
scribing danger posed by counterfeit versions of cancer drug A vas tin). 
111. Cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012) (increasing maximum penalty 
for trafficking in counterfeit goods to twenty years if defendant's conduct recklessly causes 
serious bodily injury and to life sentence if defendant's conduct recklessly causes death). 
112. Nicole Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 Yale J.L. & 
Feminism 69, 69 & n.1 (1998) (listing state statutes). 
113. See United States Leadership Against HIV I AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act 
of 2003 § 2(23), 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (23) (2006) (finding that prostitution and sex trafficking 
are "causes of and factors in the spread of the HIV I AIDS epidemic"); see also Bingham, 
supra note 112, at 95 ("Historically, prostitutes have been scapegoated for the spread of 
venereal disease."). 
114. In Nevada, the one state that allows local communities to legalize prostitution, 
individuals engaged in prostitution are required by both statute and the Nevada Adminis-
trative Code to submit to HIV testing. Bingham, supra note 112, at 89. An eighteen-month 
mandatory testing program of the state did not reveal any licensed prostitutes who tested 
positive for HIV. James Grant Snell, Note, Mandatory HIV Testing and Prostitution: The 
World's Oldest Profession and the World's Newest Deadly Disease, 45 Hastings LJ. 1565, 
1591 n.161 (1994) (citing No Infection in Nevada Brothels, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, at 
C3). 
115. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code§ 647f (West 2010) (making prostitution a felony on 
second offense if defendant knew that he or she had tested positive for HIV); accord, e.g., 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-7-201.7 (West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 796.08(4) (West Supp. 
2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 529.090(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 567.020 (West 
2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201.358 (LexisNexis 2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2907.25(C) (2) (West 2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1031 (B) (West 2002); 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.§ 5902(a.1)(4) (West Supp. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-516 (2010); Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-10-1309(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
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from engaging in prostitution. 116 To the degree that the statute either 
has such an impact or is perceived as having such an impact, it decreases 
the apparent danger (that is, lowers the costs) of utilizing the services of 
a prostitute. Moreover, by harshly penalizing HIV-aware prostitution, leg-
islatures may be eliminating an asymmetry of information between 
'johns" and prostitutes that might impede an "efficient" exchange of 
money for services. 
The complex and tragic context in which an HIV-positive sex worker 
sells her117 services is wholly different from the used car salesman who 
hawks low quality automobiles. However, just as car buyers might fear 
that they are purchasing "lemons," so too might johns be concerned that 
they are purchasing sex from infected prostitutes. By raising the stakes of 
engaging in HIV-positive prostitution, the HIV-aware prostitution statutes 
decrease buyers' concerns that prostitutes are hiding their HIV-positive 
condition. 
That HIV-aware prostitution statutes may be perfecting the first-
order market for prostitution is all the more troubling if these laws do 
not actually decrease the incidence of HIV-infected individuals engaging 
in prostitution. 118 First, there is the possibility that the statutes will deter 
prostitutes from getting tested.119 Second, and perhaps more likely given 
the context in which many prostitutes are making the decision to enter 
into the sex trade, few HIV-positive sex workers may be deterred from 
engaging in prostitution by the increase in penalties associated with the 
statute. If clients incorrectly believe that the HIV-positive statutes are effec-
tive, it is possible that the statutes will improve the first-order prostitution 
market without actually lowering the risk of contracting HIV. 
Like the prostitution example, laws enhancing penalties for illegal 
abortions that result in the death of the mother may actually improve the 
market for the first-order crime of providing illegal abortions. While Roe 
v. Wade and its progeny held that a woman's right to an abortion is pro-
tected in the first two trimesters, some abortion services can still be crim-
116. See Scott Burris, Leo Beletsky, Joseph Burleson, Patricia Case & Zita Lazzarini, 
Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39 Ariz. St. LJ. 467, 
471 (2007) (concluding that criminal law has little influence on sexual risk behavior); Zita 
Lazzarini, Sarah Bray & Scott Burris, Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk 
Behavior, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 239, 252 (2002) (arguing that case for "criminal law as a 
means of preventing HIV ... looks weak"). 
117. Although the female pronoun is used here, the same concerns about HIV trans-
mission also affect the substantial market for male prostitutes. 
118. See Lazzarini et a!., supra note 116, at 247 (noting research showing lack of 
change in behavior of HIV-positive individuals). 
119. See Michael L. C1osen, Mary Anne Bobinski, Donald HJ. Hermann, John F. 
Hernandez, Gene P. Schultz & J. Kelly Strader, Discussion, Criminalization of an Epi-
demic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 921, 964 (1994) ("There-
fore, these statutes may actually encourage individuals not to test so that they would not be 
armed with knowledge that, at another time, could be used against them." (statement of 
John F. Hernandez)). 
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inalized. 12° Forty-one states criminalize abortions after a certain point in 
the pregnancy. 121 Nearly forty states criminalize abortions performed by 
someone other than a doctor. 122 A variety of factors may contribute to a 
woman's decision to pursue an illegal abortion. The pregnancy may 
simply have progressed to the point beyond which abortion has been 
criminalized. Young women required to notify their parents that they 
plan to terminate their pregnancy may instead seek to obtain one on the 
black market. 123 Financial pressure may also contribute to the decision to 
seek an illegal abortion. While the nature of illegal markets tends to 
make data imprecise, 124 one study has suggested that states that restricted 
funding for abortion services experienced a significant rise in the num-
ber of illegal abortions. 125 
The substantial health risks associated with illegally terminating a 
pregnancy likely act as a significant deterrent to pursuing a black-market 
abortion: Individuals providing illegal abortion services are likely to have 
inferior medical training; the procedures are likely to be performed in 
unsanitary conditions; and there tend to be fewer opportunities for 
follow-up care. 126 The provision of black market abortions is not only ille-
gal, it can also be hazardous to the mother's health. The criminalization 
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (permitting state regulation 
and prohibition of abortion under certain circumstances); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 156-60 (2007) (upholding criminalization of partial-birth abortion method as legiti-
mate exercise oflegislative discretion). 
121. State Policies in Brief: State Policies on Later Abortion, Guttmacher Inst., (Oct. 
I, 2012), http:/ /www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_FLTA.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
122. E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code§ l23468(a) (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 
18-6-101(1), -102 (West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 390.0lll(2) (West Supp. 2012); Idaho 
Code Ann.§ l8-608A (2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 311.750 (LexisNexis 20ll); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1598(3) (2004); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 20-208 (LexisNexis 
2009); Mont. Code Ann.§ 50-20-109(a) (20ll); N.Y. Penal Law§ 125.05(3) (McKinney 
2009); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.§ 171.003 (West 2010). 
123. See Karen Flax, Comment, Women's Rights and the Proposed Family Protection 
Act, 36 U. Miami L. Rev. 141, 151 (1981) (describing concern that pregnant minors will 
"attempt to self-abort or to obtain an illegal abortion rather than risk parental 
notification"). 
124. See Richard W. Bourne, Abortion in 1938 and Today: Plus (:a Change, Plus C'est 
la Mime Chose, 12 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 225, 273 (2003) (describing ditliculty of 
obtaining data on illegal abortion). 
125. See Nancy Binkin,Julian Gold & Willard Cates Jr., Illegal Abortion Deaths in the 
United States: Why Are They Still Occurring?, 14 Fam. Plan. Persp. 163, 166 (1982) (con-
cluding that restrictive funding policies contributed to higher rate of illegal abortions and 
concomitant higher rate of illegal abortion-related deaths). 
126. See Gail D. Hollister, Tort Suits for Injuries Sustained During Illegal Abortions: 
The Effects of judicial Bias, 45 Viii. L. Rev. 387, 421 (2000) (identifying health dangers of 
illegal abortions); see also William Cates, Jr., David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, The 
Public Health Impact of Legal Abortion: 30 Years Later, 35 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. 
Health 25, 27 (2003) (noting reduced morbidity and mortality following increased availa-
bility oflegal abortion). 
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of abortions thus leads to a second-order crime--deaths resulting from 
illegal abortions. 
Eight states have laws that enhance the penalties for criminal abor-
tions that result in the death of the woman.127 Under Florida law, the un-
lawful termination of a pregnancy in the third trimester is classified as a 
third-degree felony. 128 An unlawful termination is a second-degree fel-
ony, however, if it results in the death of the patient. 129 By increasing the 
penalty for performing an illegal abortion in which the patient dies, the 
law is designed to encourage illegal abortion providers to take greater 
safety precautions. However, just as the HlV-aware prostitution statutes 
reduce the perceived risk of engaging the services of a prostitute, so too 
do the penalty enhancements for abortions resulting in death improve 
the market for illegal abortions. That the penalty enhancements help to 
perfect the market for illegal abortions does not necessarily suggest that 
they are inappropriate. Rather, it serves as a reminder of how complex 
and difficult the criminalization of related crimes can be. 
The criminalization of second-order crimes can even resolve collec-
tive action problems that create inefficiencies in first-order criminal mar-
kets. As discussed above, a drug dealer's decision to arm himself may 
represent his response to a classic prisoner's dilemma-there are signifi-
cant benefits to arming oneself when others go unprotected, and signifi-
cant dangers to encountering someone else with a gun while one is un-
armed.130 As a result, every dealer goes armed despite preferring a mar-
ket in which no one carries a gun. Moreover, the prevalence of guns 
(and thus gun violence) likely increases the cost of participating in illegal 
drug markets, thereby reducing both the supply and demand for 
drugs.131 
In 1986, Congress added an important new weapon against narcotics 
traffickers by mandating a minimum five-year sentence for using or carry-
ing a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 132 The de-
cision to enhance the penalty for armed drug trafficking as opposed to 
drug dealing in general suggests that the goal of the statute was to deter 
127. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 18-6-102; Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 390.0111 (10) (b); Mich. Comp. 
Laws. Ann.§ 750.14 (West 2004); Miss. Code Ann.§ 97-3-3(1) (2006); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 
30-5-3 (2004); N.Y. Penal Law§ 125.20(3); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (2009); W.Va. Code 
Ann.§ 61-2-8 (LexisNexis 2010). 
128. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111 (10) (a). 
129. Id. § 390.0111(10)(b). 
130. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing gun possession 
among criminals as prisoner's dilemma). 
131. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing effect of gun posses-
sion on supply and demand for illegal goods). 
132. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a) (2), 100 Stat. 449, 
456-57 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (I) (A)). For a detailed discussion of the back-
ground of§ 924(c) (1), see generally Michael]. Riordan, Using a Firearm During and in 
Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing 
Provision of 18 USC§ 924(c) (1), 30 Duq. L. Rev. 39, 39-43 (1991). 
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gun violence as opposed to simply providing another weapon for the war 
on drugs. Ironically, it is conceivable that the act was welcomed by drug 
dealers. By raising the cost of carrying a firearm during a narcotics trans-
action, Congress may have helped resolve dealers' prisoner's dilemma 
and promoted the kind of cooperation that lowers the cost of engaging 
in illegal drug activity. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PERFECTING CRIMINAL MARKETS 
If lawmakers are, in fact, inadvertently perfecting first-order criminal 
markets, the inevitable question is: Does it matter? Surely the need to 
prevent street violence justifies criminalizing the sale of fake drugs, even 
if one side effect of such a ban is to improve the first-order drug market. 
The answer is that the relationship between first- and second-order 
criminal markets is important even if the criminalization of both activi-
ties can ultimately be justified. The perfection of criminal markets is not 
just a quirky economic irony, but rather an important systemic dynamic 
with broad implications. An appreciation of the relationship between 
first- and second-order crimes is not only essential to the formation of 
sound criminal justice policy, but it may also help explain the rapid ex-
pansion of the criminal code and the growing complexity of federal and 
state sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the recognition that criminaliza-
tion has the capacity to actually improve related criminal markets may 
promote a normative shift in the perception of regulatory alternatives to 
criminalization. 
Regulatory strategies that reduce harm are often criticized for help-
ing individuals engage in socially undesirable behavior.133 If the criminal 
law similarly "assists" other antisocial activity, then perhaps those harm-
reduction strategies will no longer be accused of tacitly condoning bad 
acts and instead the costs and benefits of such policies will be evaluated 
on the same footing as the criminalization option. 
133. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Costin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIV I AIDS Among 
Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Ap-
proaches to Disease Prevention, 46 Emory LJ. 587, 645-46 (1997) ("[Opponents of nee-
dle exchange programs] believe that the state should send a consistent message about the 
harms of drug use and should not directly facilitate drug injection .... When the state 
permits or condones the distribution and sale of syringes ... arguably, the state is engag-
ing in an immoral act."); Can Clean Needles Slow the AIDS Epidemic?, 59 Consumer Rep. 
466, 467 (1994) ("Distributing needles 'undercuts the credibility of society's message that 
drug use is illegal and morally wrong' .... " (quoting Robert Martinez, Dir. of Pres. 
George H.W. Bush's Office ofNat'l Drug Control Policy)); see also Steven R. Salbu, Nee· 
die Exchange, HIV Transmission, and Illegal Drug Use: Informing Law and Public Policy 
with Science and Rational Discourse, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 105, 126 (1996) ("Christine 
Whitman, the governor of New Jersey, has stated that she is opposed to needle exchanges 
'because she "doesn't want to be a party to an illegal activity.""' (quoting Clean Needles 
Are Vital in the Fight Against AIDS, Record (Bergen County, NJ.), Mar. 22, 1995, at C6)). 
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The remainder of this Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A explores 
policy implications of perfecting criminal markets for legislators, judges, 
prosecutors, and members of law enforcement. Part III.B then suggests 
that the dynamic relationship between first- and second-order criminal 
markets may help to explain both the rapid growth in state and federal 
criminal codes and the concomitant expansion of criminal liability that 
has led some scholars to argue that we face a crisis of overcriminaliza-
tion.134 Finally, Part III.C examines normative implications of the fact 
that criminalizing second-order antisocial activities may improve first-
order criminal markets. 
A. Perfecting Criminal Justice Policy 
The possibility that legislators are inadvertently increasing criminal 
activity has profound implications for criminal justice policy. While there 
is growing recognition that institutional interests play a significant role in 
shaping criminal laws, 135 few scholars dismiss the claim that legislators 
generally seek to act in the public's interest. 136 Even those critics who al-
lege that many recent federal and state criminal justice initiatives are 
'"contrary to what almost everyone with close knowledge of the topic 
thinks makes much sense"' do not attribute the failings of the criminal 
justice system to bad intentions. 137 In fact, evidence suggests that persua-
sive policy arguments that are grounded in concerns shared by the gen-
eral public can have a powerful influence on legislators. 138 As a result, 
lawmakers are likely to be particularly interested to learn that the crimi-
nalization of one activity may improve a related criminal market. 
Moreover, there are increasingly urgent calls for other actors in the 
criminal justice system-prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement offi-
134. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
& Soc. Sci., 157, 157 (1967). 
135. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 510 (describing prosecutors' and legislators' institu-
tional incentives tq push for policies which consistently expand criminal liability). 
136. See id. (acknowledging that criminal justice policies can be powerfully affected 
by ideology and public-interest goals, despite role institutional interests often play in 
pathological politics of criminal law). 
137. Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 23 (quoting Howard Margolis, Deal-
ing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues 5 
( 1996)). Beale, who attempts to explain the politicization of crime and prevalence of 
counterproductive criminal justice policies, acknowledges that some scholars have chal-
lenged her claim that current criminal justice policies are irrational, arguing "that the 
majority of experts are wrong and that the public is indeed correct." Id. at 32 (citing John 
J. Dilulio,Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 12-
15 (1996); James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in Crime 449, 498-503 (James Q. 
Wilson &Joan Petersilia eds., 1995)). 
138. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 719-20 
(2005) (concluding legislators can be swayed by policy arguments grounded in concerns 
shared by general public). 
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cials-to rationalize their own decisionmaking processes. 139 Just as under-
standing the dynamics of first- and second-order criminal markets will 
help legislators make informed decisions, so too can it help these actors 
improve the implementation of criminal justice policy. Indeed, even if 
legislators and other criminal justice actors choose not to take the impact 
of first- and second-order crimes on each other into account when they 
make policy decisions, drawing attention to the capacity of second-order 
crimes to perfect first-order criminal markets can still improve criminal 
justice policy by encouraging policymakers to incorporate cost-benefit 
analysis into their decisionmaking. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Criminal Law. - Criminal laws are rarely 
evaluated based on their broad social impact. Instead, a criminal law is 
typically assessed in terms of the particular harm caused by the offender 
and the goals of deterrence, retribution, and moral judgment. 140 This 
focus alone may explain the failure of commentators and policymakers 
alike to recognize the critical relationship between first- and second-
order criminal markets. However, there is growing recognition that poli-
cymakers face multiple options for combating criminal harms and that 
the larger question of the public's welfare is an important consideration 
in determining which strategy to pursue.141 While the criminal justice 
system has yet to embrace cost-benefit analysis as a methodology for eval-
uating criminal law and policy, other regulatory regimes have adopted it 
as a useful mechanism for "improving the effectiveness of government 
action.'1142 There is a mounting consensus that criminal policies need to 
be more rational and that an attempt to fully assess the social costs and 
benefits of criminal laws, while daunting, may be productive nonethe-
less.143 Even ifpolicymakers, prosecutors,judges, and members of the law 
enforcement community refrain from formally adopting cost-benefit 
analysis, to the extent they want to evaluate the broad impact of their 
139. See Darryl K Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 323, 
341 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis] (arguing cost-benefit analysis "can 
rationalize decision making in criminal law by correcting biases that lead to poor public 
policy and accounting for costs that criminal law neglects"). 
140. See id. at 335 ("We do not usually focus on criminal law as part of a complex sys-
tem with multiple cause-and-effect relationships. Instead, we focus on the state's response 
to individual offenders and the direct harm caused by the offense."). 
141. See id. at 326 (observing that "criminal law is only one policy option for dealing 
with harmful wrongdoing"). 
142. Id. at 333; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the 
Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 24 7, 252 ( 1996) (describing advantages of "cost-benefit 
state" but also suggesting officials must be nuanced in their approach to assigning value). 
143. Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 119, 129 
(2005) (arguing cost-benefit analysis could improve decisionmaking about sentencing); 
see also Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 343 (arguing cost-benefit analysis 
can lead decisionmakers to "uncover costs not now readily attributed to criminal justice 
policy"). 
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choices on social welfare, they must take into account the dynamic rela-
tionship between first- and second-order criminal markets. . 
2. Perfecting the Legislative Process. - The possibility that new penal 
statutes will improve related criminal markets should certainly be of in-
terest to legislators as they seek to promote the public interest. First, leg-
islators choosing among various policy options will be interested to learn 
that some criminal statutes carry hidden costs that may offset some of the 
public safety benefits that the laws were intended to engender. By taking 
into account a proposed statute's impact on second-order criminal mar-
kets, a legislature will be better equipped to decide whether the statute 
will actually promote the public interest. More importantly, by under-
standing the relationship between first- and second-order criminal mar-
kets, a legislature can begin to calibrate the penalties associated with 
each criminal statute. While economists (and law scholars who consider 
themselves economists) have long advocated for "optimal" penalties that 
are calculated to deter crime efficiently, 144 such proposals realistically are 
difficult to implement.145 It is one thing to develop a formula which, if 
theoretically optimized, would lead to an efficient level of crime. It is an-
other thing entirely to identify actual values for the formula's variables 
and to calculate an appropriate sanction. By recognizing the dynamic 
relationship between first- and second-order crimes, legislators can begin 
to fashion a more integrated structure of criminal sanctions. If criminal-
izing the sale of fake illegal drugs inadvertently improves the market for 
genuine drugs, a legislature might consider offsetting the impact of the 
new law by strengthening the penalty for the first-order crime. The result 
is a system of penal sanctions that, while perhaps not truly "optimized" to 
produce the most efficient level of crime, at least are structured to work 
together in concert. 
Focusing legislative attention on the potential for second-order 
crimes to perfect first-order criminal markets may have the added benefit 
of shifting the political discourse in a way that will promote more rational 
criminal justice policies. For several decades,146 the politics of crime have 
144. E.g., Becker, supra note 5, at 172; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 89, 89-90 (1984) (introducing 
model to measure optimal use of sanctions). The idea that criminal penalties should be 
calculated to provide sufficient incentive to deter crime dates (at least) to Jeremy 
Bentham, who suggested that "the quantity of punishment must not be less, in any case, 
than what is sufficient to outweigh the profit of the offence." Jeremy Bentham, An Intro-
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 175 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 
The Athlone Press 1970) (1789); accord Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 
1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 365,399 (photo. reprint 1962) (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
145. See Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formu-
lation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 Geo. LJ. 949, 977-80 
(2003) (describing many complex variables making it difficult to calculate optimal pun-
ishment). 
146. Some observers trace the politicization of the crime issue to Richard Nixon's 
successful promotion of his "law and order platform" in 1968. See Harry A. Chernoff, 
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been dominated by forces which tend to promote punitive approaches 
that have been regarded as unproductive by many criminal justice ex-
perts.147 Several scholars have suggested that the perceived need for poli-
ticians to appear "tough on crime,"148 and the "culture of fear" created by 
the graphic depictions of crime in news and entertainment media149 have 
combined to ensure that the consistent political response to crime is to 
increase sanctions and expand criminalliability.150 More recently, psycho-
logical research has identified various cognitive biases which amplify 
these forces, further distorting criminal justice policy in ways that are ul-
timately unlikely to increase public safety.151 Cognitive errors resulting 
from the "availability heuristic," 152 overconfidence, 153 overgeneraliza-
tion, 154 inaccurate estimation of risks and benefits, 155 and biased infor-
Christopher M. Kelly & John R. Kroger, The Politics of Crime, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 527, 
532-33 (1996) (noting that since 1968, "Republican Presidents and presidential nominees 
have used the crime issue to put Democrats on the defensive"). 
147. See Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 25 (noting low support among 
criminal justice experts for increased sentences); see also Michael Tonry & David P. 
Farrington, Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, 19 Crime &Just. 1, 6 (1995) (citing 
studies showing "widespread agreement over time and space that alterations in sanction-
ing policies are unlikely substantially to influence crime rates"). 
148. E.g., Chernoff et al., supra note 146, at 532-34 (discussing political advantage of 
support for "tougher" penalties). 
149. See Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 45-47 (describing meteoric rise of 
depictions of crime in news media and development of industry adage "[i]f it bleeds, it 
leads"); see also Jonathon Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 114, 208, 239 (2007) 
(describing how media images of crime have created public perception of extreme danger 
of criminal violence in many aspects of daily life). 
150. See Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 40-41, 49 (describing political 
rhetoric and media influence as two explanations of punitive nature of American criminal 
justice policy). 
151. See id. at 52 (suggesting that psychology of cognition and risk assessment may 
explain divergence between public and expert opinion on criminal justice policy); Brown, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 341-42 (describing how cognitive bias skews judg-
ments about criminal law and policy). 
152. The "availability heuristic" describes people's perception of events as more 
probable if there is a vivid example of the event. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 
139, at 342. For example, members of the general public may overestimate the probability 
of being killed in a terrorist attack because of the vivid example of September 11th. 
153. "Overconfidence" describes the tendency for people to base opinions on slim in-
formation with great confidence and subsequently to resist indications that the initial 
opinion was incorrect. Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 59. 
154. "Overgeneralization" describes the excessive degree to which people base gen-
eral theories on a few examples or even a single example. For example, "[h)earing about 
one parolee committing a violent crime is likely to foster generalization to all parolees, 
with the result that most people will overestimate by a considerable margin the failure 
rates for parole." Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 Crime 
&Just. 99,121 (1992). 
155. Studies have demonstrated that people often underestimate risks when the ben-
efits of an activity seem clear and high and underestimate benefits when risks are per-
ceived as high. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 342; see also Cass R. 
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mation processing156 combine to skew judgments in ways that are unlikely 
to produce effective criminal justice policy. Fortunately, a deliberate and 
careful consideration of costs and benefits can provide an institutional 
check on the cognitive biases that often distort policy decisions. 157 
Focusing policymakers on second-order crimes' impact on first-
order criminal markets can supplement and encourage the kind of ra-
tional cost-benefit analysis that is likely to result in better policy choices. 
This is not to say that cost-benefit analysis should entirely substitute for 
the intuitive moral judgments of policymakers. 158 But it does suggest that 
increased attention to some of the overlooked costs of criminalization 
will do more than just incrementally add to the information at policy-
makers' disposal; it will actually encourage a type of analysis that is re-
sistant to cognitive error. 
3. Perfecting the Implementation of Criminal Justice Policy. - Even if legis-
lators attempt to internalize the impact of second-order crimes on first-
order criminal markets by adjusting the crimes' respective penalties, the 
prices they set for crimes are, at best, "suggested retail prices." In fact, the 
true price of crime is shaped as much by the actors who implement crim-
inal justice policy as it is by the policymakers themselves. 159 Focusing at-
tention on the potential for second-order crimes to perfect first-order 
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059, 1070 (2000) [here-
inafter Sunstein, Cognition and CBA] ("The mere existence of discussions of new risks can 
aggravate concern, even when the discussions take the form of assurances that the risk 
level is relatively low."). 
156. "Biased information processing" describes the tendency of individuals to dis-
count new information that challenges their existing beliefs and, similarly, their tendency 
to give significant credence to information that confirms views they already hold. Beale, 
Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 59-60; Roberts, supra note 154, at 123-24. 
157. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
1276, 1294 (2005); see also Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 341 ("[Cost-
benefit analysis] can rationalize decision making in criminal law by correcting biases that 
lead to poor public policy and accounting for costs that criminal law neglects."); Sunstein, 
Cognition and CBA, supra note 155, at 1071 ("[C)ost-benefit analysis might ensure that 
policy is driven not by hysteria or unfounded alarm but by a full appreciation of the effects 
of relevant risks and their control."). 
158. See Alan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values at Risk 94, 98 (Douglas MacLean 
ed., 1986) ("A refined risk-cost-benefit analysis, because it is sensitive to details of the situa-
tion in a way that no person's intuitive picture of the situation could be, cannot be ex-
pected to match a person's clear moral judgments in every case .... "). 
159. Ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved with plea bargains. David A. 
Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea 
Bargaining, 120 Yale LJ. 1532, 1539 (2011). While the plea bargaining process often does 
not entail the kind of individualized haggling that its name suggests, the generally ac-
cepted "price" for each crime is largely the product of prosecutorial policy and consistency 
with local sentencing tradition. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Crimi-
nal justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117,2130-31 (1998) (explaining that rules of plea bar-
gaining are "more like those of the supermarket than those of the flea market" and true 
"price" of crime is set by prosecutors, subject to efforts of defense attorneys to persuade 
them that more lenient approach is appropriate under circumstances). 
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criminal markets can improve the implementation of criminal justice 
policy by helping such actors make more informed decisions and optimal 
allocations of limited resources. 
a. Perfecting Prosecutors. - Prosecutors play a crucial role in determin-
ing the price of crime. They decide whether to initiate or decline a pros-
ecution and whether to offer a defendant the chance to plead to a lesser 
charge. Prosecutors can recommend a particular sentence to a presiding 
judge and, in some jurisdictions, make a plea deal contingent upon that 
recommended sentence.160 Prosecutors also enjoy broad discretion to 
shape criminal justice priorities and to "move resources effectively from 
one area to another depending on social need." 161 They can shape alter-
native sentencing opportunities by devising or influencing the develop-
ment of drug and domestic violence treatment programs, juvenile justice 
facilities, and community-based courts linked to social service agencies.162 
They als·o coordinate with law enforcement to set policing strategies. 163 
Each of these decisions impacts the price of crime by either changing the 
probability of being arrested and charged or by shifting the expected 
penalty that will be applied to those found guilty. 
Because prosecutors play such an integral role in setting the price of 
crime, their decisions regarding one crime have reverberations in other 
criminal markets. If prosecutors routinely offer lenient pleas to defend-
ants charged with selling fake narcotics, they will lessen the impact that 
the crime has on the first-order drug market. Conversely, the decision to 
prosecute a crime to the fullest extent of the law may have counter-
intuitive implications for the overall crime rate. As prosecutors make de-
cisions concerning second-order crimes, they will want to consider care-
fully the impact those decisions have on related criminal markets. 
Unlike many administrative actors, prosecutors are not obligated by 
statute to consider the costs and benefits of their decisions.164 This does 
not mean, however, that cost-benefit analysis cannot assist prosecutors as 
they implement criminal justice policy. Indeed, the Department of 
Justice has begun to incorporate an explicit accounting of the costs and 
160. See, e.g., Md. R. 4-243(c) (3) (requiring consent of both parties before judge can 
offer disposition more favorable to defendant than provided for in plea agreement). Even 
in jurisdictions that do not explicitly require the judge to obtain the consent of the prose-
cutor before departing from the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, it is rare for 
judges to depart from the agreed-upon sentence. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 42, 88 (2002) (describing judges as 
part of system of "repeat players" who "have every reason to accept the recommendation 
from the parties to move the case along"). 
161. Lynch, supra note 159, at 2138. 
162. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 367. 
163. See id. at 369 (describing "how prosecutors can encourage and coordinate with 
law enforcement agencies to pursue criminal investigations through means that impose 
the social costs of punishment on stable rather than marginal communities"). 
164. See id. at 327 (observing that "analytic decision procedures ... ha[ve] not yet 
extended to the criminal justice system"). 
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benefits of prosecutorial action in its own guidelines. 165 Recognizing the 
dynamic relationship between first- and second-order criminal markets is 
an important step toward successfully utilizing cost-benefit analysis to 
guide prosecutorial discretion. 166 Moreover, as discussed above, a careful 
analysis of costs and benefits will not only help ensure that prosecutors 
consider the full implications of their decisions; it may also counter the 
same cognitive biases that can distort legislative decisions.167 
b. Perfecting Judicial Decisionmaking. - Like prosecutors, judges play 
an important role in determining the price of crime.168 While the ascend-
ance of plea and charge bargaining and, until recently, the dominance of 
mandatory sentencing guidelines helped to shift the locus of power from 
judges to prosecutors, 169 judges still play a critical role in deciding the 
price that a guilty defendant ultimately pays for his or her crime. As a 
result, just as legislators will want to consider the dynamic relationship 
between first- and second-order criminal markets as they calibrate the 
statutory penalties for each crime, so too will judges want to consider 
how their sentencing decisions affect other criminal markets. This does 
not necessarily suggest that a judge should sentence a defendant charged 
with a second-order crime more leniently. Rather, judges, like legislators, 
may need to coordinate their sentencing philosophies. It is possible that 
the need to harshly penalize a second-order crime will sometimes suggest 
a stronger sentence is needed for the first-degree crime as well. Con-
versely, as judges consider "sending a message" with a severe sentence for 
a second-order crime, they may want to consider what kind of message 
they will be sending to related criminal markets. 
c. Perfecting the Allocation of Law Enforcement &sources. - In his pio-
neering article introducing his economic approach to crime, Gary 
Becker explained that deterrence is a function of both the severity of 
punishment and the probability of detection.170 While Becker's original 
165. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-28.1000, available at 
http:/ /wwwjustice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-
28.1000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last modified Aug. 2008) (permitting U.S. 
Attorneys to consider collateral costs of prosecuting corporations). 
166. See Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 139, at 327 (describing potential 
for cost-benefit analysis to usefully constrain prosecutorial discretion). 
167. See supra Part III.A2 (discussing benefits of cost-benefit analysis for legislators 
when creating and modifying criminal law). 
168. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 145, at 997 (':Judges, not legislators, impose 
sentences, and given the wide sentencing discretion that American judges traditionally 
have had and continue to have in the vast majority of states, judicial discretion not legisla-
tive policy will determine deterrent effectiveness."). 
169. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional 
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33,95-102 (2003) (describing 
how plea bargaining and mandatory sentencing guidelines have shifted power into prose-
cutors' hands). 
170. Becker, supra note 5, at 1 76; see also Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoid-
ance, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1331, 1345 (2006) ("[T]he deterrent force exerted by law is viewed 
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work presumed that the probability of detection and the severity of sanc-
tions were largely fungible, 171 some studies suggest that an increase in the 
probability of apprehension is likely to have a greater deterrent effect 
than a similar increase in the size of the penalty. 172 As a result, decisions 
affecting the likelihood that a criminal will be detected and appre-
hended may have a greater deterrent impact than legislative, judicial, 
and prosecutorial decisions affecting sentencing.173 The dynamic rela-
tionship between first- and second-order criminal markets is thus at least 
as relevant to decisions affecting the probability of apprehension as it is 
to decisions regarding the severity of punishment. 
While criminal deterrence (and thus public safety) is largely a nmc-
tion of the probability of apprehension, the probability of apprehension 
is, in turn, largely a function of the allocation of resources. 174 As a result, 
one of the most important criminal justice policy decisions revolves 
around how to spend scarce law enforcement resources so as to get the 
most "bang for our buck."175 The use of high-tech mapping and infor-
mation-management systems has been heralded as "the most revolution-
as the conjunction of two factors: the probability that violations are 'detected' (i.e., inves-
tigated, uncovered, and successfully prosecuted) and the magnitude of the sanction im-
posed in the event of detection."). 
171. See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 Va. L. 
Rev. 1295, 1302-04 (2008) (summarizing Becker's model). While Becker's analysis treated 
the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions as fungible, he acknowledged the 
commonly held view that the probability of detection was likely the stronger variable of the 
two. See Becker, supra note 5, at 176 ("[A] common generalization by persons with judi-
cial experience is that a change in the probability has a greater effect on the number of 
offenses than a change in the punishment .... "). 
172. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 
451, 462 n.34 (2003) (citing studies described in James Q. Wilson & Richard]. Hermstein, 
Crime and Human Nature 397-401 (1985)). One possible explanation is that criminals 
may substantially discount the disutility of increases in future punishment. See A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the 
Theory of Deterrence, 28]. Legal Stud. 1, 2 (1999) (describing impact of discounting on 
deterrent effect of criminal penalties). 
173. See Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen & Iljoong Kim, Deterrence and Pub-
lic Policy: Trade-Offs in the Allocation of Police Resources, 18 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 77, 79 
(1998) ("Assume that the police are in the business of producing crime deterrence. By 
allocating capital and labor to control the various crime types, police influence the level of 
such crimes."). 
174. Ryan Cantrell, Note, Finding Nemo ... and Eating Him: The Failure of the 
United Nations to Force Internalization of the Negative Social Costs That Result from 
Overfishing, 5 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 381, 395 (2006) ("The probability of appre-
hension is a function of the resources devoted to detecting the crime .... "); see also M. 
Todd Henderson, justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 15, 16 
(2010) ("Public safety is the most important metric for elected officials (especially at the 
local level) and allocating scarce crime-fighting resources efficiently is an essential element 
of achieving public safety."). 
175. Daniel G. Moriarty, Extending the Defense of Renunciation, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 
5 (1989) ("[I)n justice as in national defense, we should get the most 'bang for our 
buck.'"). 
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ary public-sector achievement of the last quarter-century."176 In addition 
to improving accountability, "data-driven policing" is intently focused on 
helping law enforcement efficiently allocate crime-fighting resources. 177 
Compstat, the pioneering data-mapping system implemented in New 
York City in 1994 and replicated in a number of U.S. cities over the last 
decade, has been praised for enabling the rapid redeployment of police 
resources based upon a rise in a particular type of crime or the recogni-
tion that a particular area is experiencing increased criminal activity. 178 
Given the amount of money and attention devoted to optimizing the 
allocation of law enforcement resources, surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to the impact that allocation decisions have on related crimi-
nal markets. If legislators and law enforcement officials want to maximize 
the impact of their limited resources, they should consider whether the 
allocation of resources to fight one crime might help to improve the 
market for a related crime. As discussed above, the criminalization of 
fake drugs can improve the market for genuine illegal drugs. 179 An in-
creased allocation of police officers to seek out and arrest fake-drug 
dealers can similarly improve the genuine drug market. Just as increased 
penalties for selling fake drugs increase users' confidence that they are 
purchasing "quality product," the allocation of departmental resources to 
fighting fake drugs will reduce the costs associated with seeking out 
known dealers and lower the risk premium that users demand from 
dealers. 180 At a minimum, the relationship between criminal markets sug-
gests that law enforcement initiatives that seek to broadly reduce individ-
uals' incentives to engage in crime are likely to have a greater social im-
pact than programs that are targeted against a specific criminal activity. 
Perhaps more importantly, the relationship between first- and second-
order criminal markets suggests that resources employed to increase ar-
rest rates in a particular criminal market may provide less of a public 
safety benefit than might initially be presumed. An accurate assessment 
of the true benefit of allocating resources to increasing arrest rates may 
ultimately suggest that policymakers should reevaluate the relative merit 
176. Heather Mac Donald, Compstat and Its Enemies, City J. (Feb. 17, 2010), http:/ I 
www.cityjournal.org/201 0/ eon0217hm.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
177. See id. ("One of Compstat's most powerful accomplishments was to yoke crime 
data and analysis intimately to deployment decisions."); see also Henderson et al., supra 
note 174, at 29 (describing police departments' use of crime-mapping technology to help 
allocate resources). 
178. See generally James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making 
Sense of Compstat: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police 
Departments, 41 Law & Soc'y Rev. 147 (2007) (describing and assessing Compstat). 
179. See supra Part II.B (discussing how criminalization of second-<Jrder crimes per-
fects first-<Jrder criminal markets). 
180. Which, in this case, would take the form of a "risk discount." 
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of alternative crime prevention measures that may, ultimately, provide a 
greater public safety "bang for the buck."181 
4. Perfecting the Policy Debate.- Even if one is skeptical of lawmakers' 
and other criminal justice actors' ability to deter crime by manipulating 
criminal laws and penalties, 182 the relationship between related criminal 
markets is still relevant to current debates over criminal justice policy. 
The impact of second-order crimes on first-order criminal markets sug-
gests a level of complexity that has been missing in the public dialogue 
over criminal law. 183 At a minimum, the interconnected nature of crimi-
nal markets indicates that lawmakers' perpetual solution-to ratchet up 
punishment and criminalize antisocial activity many times over184-may 
appeal to the public's desire for simple and straightforward solutions but 
may do little to promote public safety. Perhaps the recognition that fur-
ther criminalization can promote crime will lead to a more nuanced dis-
cussion about the ways in which society can best deter antisocial behav-
Ior. 
B. Perfecting Our Understanding of (Over)criminalization 
The potential for second-order crimes to perfect first-order criminal 
markets may provide some valuable insight into the overcriminalization 
crisis that has been a focus of legal scholars for the last forty years. 185 
Criminal law has been described as a "one-way ratchet,"186 constantly 
expanding the scope of criminal liability and perpetually increasing the 
penalties associated with each crime. 187 As discussed above, various theo-
181. See Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Monetary Costs and Benefits of 
Crime Prevention Programs, 27 Crime & Just. 305, 345-46 (2000) (describing six catego-
ries of community crime prevention programs ranging from strategies fostering greater 
youth socialization to order maintenance policies targeting physical and personal disorder 
and petty crimes). 
182. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 145, at 951 (describing "growing evidence to 
suggest skepticism about the criminal law's deterrent effect"). 
183. See id. at 952 ("The deterrent process involves complex interactions, like substi-
tution effects, that make deterrent predictions enormously difficult."). 
184. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509 (describing criminal law as "one-way ratchet that 
makes an ever larger slice of the population felons, and that turns real felons into felons 
several times over"). 
185. See id. at 507 ("[C]riminallaw's breadth is old news. It has long been a source 
of academic complaint; indeed, it has long been the starting point for virtually all the 
scholarship in this field .... ").For a seminal work published in 1967 explaining the over-
criminalization crisis, see Kadish, supra note 134. 
186. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509. But see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decrimi-
nalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 225 (2007) [hereinafter Brown, Democracy and Decrimi-
nalization] (challenging notion that criminal codes are constantly expanding and suggest-
ing some areas of criminal law have, in fact, contracted over time). 
187. See, e.g., Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 51-64 (describing psycho-
logical framework for expansion of criminal law). 
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ries have been offered to explain this unremitting expansion.188 Some 
scholars blame institutional interests that encourage prosecutors and leg-
islators to push for broad criminal liability.189 Others have pointed to a 
legislative process that exaggerates the temporary passions of the elec-
torate.190 The rising influence of media images of crime has also been 
blamed for contributing to increased efforts to expand the criminal 
code. Finally, some academics have suggested that cognitive psychology 
can explain the public's, and thus elected officials', penchant for puni-
tive and expansive approaches to fighting crime. 191 Ultimately, the explo-
sive growth of the criminal code is likely due to some combination of the 
many explanations offered by scholars. 
The relationship between first- and second-order criminal markets 
should not wholly supplant other theories that purport to explain the 
expansion of the criminal law. Indeed, one of the chief aspects of the 
overcriminalization phenomenon is the dramatic growth of regulatory 
crimes192-a likely unrelated aspect of the expansion of the criminal 
code. However, the perfection of criminal markets suggests a "multiplier 
effect" that magnifies the impact of those factors that scholars argue ex-
plain the dramatic expansion of the criminal code. Media stories detail-
ing the horrific and dangerous conditions that surround human smug-
gling193 were likely the catalyst for Congress's decision to enhance the 
penalties for alien smugglers who injure or kill their human cargo.194 
However, if the effect of such laws is to increase other criminal activity, 
they may instigate further rounds of criminalization and penalization as 
the legislature seeks to undo the effects of second-order criminalization 
on related criminal markets. As a result, the relationship between first-
and second-order crimes may help explain why seemingly weak influ-
ences may in fact have a substantial impact on both the breadth and 
depth of the criminallaw.195 
The idea that first-order crimes create the opportunity for second-
order criminal markets to emerge offers a partial explanation for the in-
188. See supra notes 151-156 (discussing psychological and cognitive forces affecting 
expansion of criminal codes). 
189. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 510. 
190. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, supra note 186, at 224. 
191. Beale, Non-Legal Factors, supra note 8, at 52-53. 
192. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 748, 781 (2005) (distinguish-
ing growth in regulatory crimes-"mattress tag" offenses-from increase in morals of-
fenses). 
193. See, e.g., Verhovek, supra note 51; see also supra notes 50-53 and accompany-
ing text (describing deadly incidents of human smuggling). 
194. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of Violent 
.Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of1994). 
195. See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 512 ("Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great 
deal of conduct is criminalized, and of that conduct, a large proportion is criminalized 
many times over."). 
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crease in the number of crimes on the books. If the politics of crime 
push legislatures to expand the criminal code, each expansion plants the 
seeds for new antisocial activity to be criminalized. Moreover, if the sub-
sequent criminalization of second-order crimes offsets some of the disin-
centives to commit the first-order crime, then it is not surprising that the 
legislature's response would be either to enhance the penalties for the 
first-order crime or to attack the first-order problem with a second wave 
of criminalization. The perfection of criminal markets thus helps to ex-
plain not only the expansion of the criminal code but also why legisla-
tures see fit to return to the same antisocial conduct and criminalize it 
"many times over."196 
C. Peifecting Criminal Norms 
Criminal law does not govern conduct solely by increasing the penal-
ties for engaging in antisocial activities; it also has the capacity to pro-
mote social norms of behavior.197 In this regard, the law does not simply 
extract a price for undesirable conduct; it also regulates the social mean-
ing of such activity. 198 This expressive function of criminal law is consid-
ered by many to be a critical (and cost-effective) aspect of the law's ability 
to deter harmful behavior. 199 Yet this expressive function can, itself, have 
hidden costs. 200 Society largely benefits from the prevailing norm that 
criminalization imbues an activity with negative moral value.201 However, 
the corollary to that norm-that policies which facilitate an activity convey 
a message that the activity is morally acceptable-may not always pro-
196. Id. 
197. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 28, at 2 ("[I]n addition to creating disincentives for 
criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote various social norms of in-
dividual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the population at large."); 
see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 
349, 351 (1997) ("The decisions of individuals to commit crimes are influenced by their 
perception of others' beliefs and intentions; the law shapes information about what those 
beliefs and intentions are."); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. 
L. Rev. 903, 964 (1996) (explaining expressive function of laws "to constitute and to affect 
social meanings, social norms, and social roles"). 
198. Kahan, supra note 197, at 351. 
199. See, e.g., id. ("Given the power of social influence, laws that shape individuals' 
perceptions of each others' beliefs and intentions, for example, may often tum out to be 
the most cost-effective means of deterring crime."); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 520 ("The past 
few years have seen a growing interest in the expressive potential of criminal law-the use 
of the criminal justice system not primarily to make and carry out threats, but to send sig-
nals. [According to some] this signal-sending is the most important thing criminal law 
does." (footnote omitted)). 
200. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1697 (1996) (arguing that, under variety of plausible conditions, social norms may 
reduce social welfare). · 
201. See Kahan, supra note 197, at 362 ("Economists speak of criminal law as a mech-
anism for pricing misconduct, but ordinary citizens think of it as a convention for morally 
condemning it."). 
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mote social welfare. Consider the opposition to harm-reduction pro-
grams that allow intravenous drug users to exchange dirty needles for 
sterile ones. Critics of needle-exchange programs typically argue that, by 
facilitating the safe use of intravenous needles, exchange programs im-
plicitly condone drug use, and thus promote an activity that is both 
harmful and illegal.202 Importantly, while this argument is ultimately con-
sequentialist, focusing on the overall welfare loss resulting from in-
creased drug use, it also relies on equating facilitation with condonation. 
This "facilitation norm" is what makes harm-reduction strategies appear 
undesirable. 203 
Were needle-exchange programs the sole casualty of the facilitation 
norm, one might be tempted to simply accept the elimination of one 
seemingly viable strategy for fighting the spread of communicable dis-
eases as a necessary cost of keeping the social meaning of criminalization 
unambiguous. However, the facilitation norm may foreclose other inter-
esting policy interventions that might improve social welfare despite sup-
porting criminal activity. Imagine providing mediation services to resolve 
gang turf disputes, helping sex workers obtain documentation that indi-
cates regular HIV testing, or free lab testing for illegal narcotics to ensure 
purity.204 Consider some of the benefits of allowing individuals who en-
gage in criminal activity to use the legal system to resolve their "business" 
disputes, so that they don't have to resort to violent self-help measures. 
There are excellent reasons not to provide such services. The inability to 
use the legal system to resolve disputes is an important economic cost 
that may make criminal activity less attractive to profit-seeking actors. 205 
202. See Salbu, supra note 133, at 129 ("Some will receive this signal as government 
condonation or countenance-if drug injection is seriously forbidden, why would the 
government be giving people implements for the express and admitted purpose of inject-
ing drugs?"); David J. Merrill, Comment, Compassion for Drug Addicts or Government-
Sanctioned Drug Use?: An Overview of the Needle Exchange Controversy, 23 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 939,941 (1996) ("[P]robably the most significant problem for the opponents of nee-
dle exchange programs[] is a fear that it condones, if not promotes, drug abuse."). 
203. An alternative argument is that the risks associated with dirty needles are an im-
portant disincentive to engaging in intravenous drug use. To the extent that one believes 
that the dangers associated with dirty needles deter drug use, one might oppose needle-
exchange programs regardless of their normative impact. 
204. The nonprofit DanceSafe currenrly sponsors a service that allows individuals to 
anonymously submit samples of "club drugs" (particularly the drug ecstasy) for free lab 
testing. EcstasyData.org, http:/ /www.ecstacydata.org (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); see also About DanceSafe, DanceSafe.org, http:/ I 
www.dancesafe.org/about-dancesafe (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2012) (describing DanceSafe as "a nonprofit, harm reduction organization pro-
moting health and safety within the rave and nightclub community"). The ingredients and 
the physical description of the drugs are then posted on the service's website. On 
DanceSafe's efforts to improve drug safety, see Robert]. MacCoun, Testing Drugs Versus 
Testing for Drug Use: Private Risk Management in the Shadow of Criminal Law, 56 DePaul 
L. Rev. 507, 524-25, 529-36 (2007). 
205. See Reuter, Disorganized Crime, supra note 85, at 109-31 (describing economic 
costs associated with running illegal businesses). 
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However, to the extent that such policies are unacceptable simply be-
cause they suggest that society condones the criminalized activity, the 
facilitation norm may be foreclosing valuable opportunities to improve 
social welfare. 
Scholars have long recognized the tension between the expressive 
function of criminal law and efforts to improve social welfare by reducing 
some of the collateral costs of committing crimes.206 It is difficult to sim-
ultaneously facilitate and condemn an activity. However, the perfection 
of criminal markets suggests that there is less of a difference between 
harm reduction strategies and criminalization than many people might 
assume. Just as the distribution of clean needles makes it cheaper and 
easier to use illegal drugs, so too does the criminalization of fake drugs 
make it cheaper and easier to sell real drugs. If the criminalization of the 
second-order crime does not signal social approval of the first-order 
criminal market, then harm-reduction policies similarly need not be re-
garded as sanctioning bad behavior. 
Focusing on the ways in which the criminalization of one behavior 
can facilitate other criminal activity need not undermine the expressive 
value of criminalizing conduct. The fact that an effort to reduce the 
harm caused by criminal conduct unintentionally boosts related criminal 
markets need not dilute the law's moral message. However, it does sug-
gest that alternative policy efforts to reduce harm should similarly be in-
terpreted as not condoning the unlawful activity. If society were to rec-
ognize the ways in which criminalization facilitates other criminal activity, 
creative harm-reduction strategies might come to entail fewer normative 
costs. 
The benefits of destigmatizing harm-reduction strategies are not lim-
ited to the drug context. At a time when the Uruguayan Penal Code 
criminalized abortion,207 the government passed a law authorizing physi-
cians to counsel women on the various methods of obtaining the safest 
illegal abortion.208 This policy was lauded for saving lives, but faced criti-
cism for delivering a mixed message as to the morality of obtaining abor-
206. See MacCoun, supra note 204, at 538 ("The expressive and crime-controlling 
functions of criminal law are often in tension with other social goals, including distributive 
justice, restorative justice, and risk regulation."). 
207. C6digo Penal [Criminal Code] art. 325 (Ediciones "Del Foro,'' 2005); see 
Joanna N. Erdman, Access to Information on Safe Abortion: A Harm Reduction and 
Human Rights Approach, 34 Harv. J.L. & Gender 413, 420 (2011) (discussing Uruguay's 
abortion law). The Uruguayan government has recently decriminalized first-trimester 
abortion. See Simon Romero, Uruguay's Senate Approves Bill Allowing First-Trimester 
Abortions for Any Reason, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2012, at A6. 
208. Law No. 18426, art. 4, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http:/ /www.parlamento.gub.uy/ 
!eyes/ AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18426 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also 
Erdman, supra note 207, at 413-15, 420-21 (describing "Uruguay Model" permitting doc-
tors to provide information about abortion, characterized "as a harm reduction initiative 
to reduce abortion-related mortality and morbidity"). 
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tions.209 One benefit of highlighting criminalization's capacity to facili-
tate crime is that, to the extent that the facilitation norm is weakened, 
such harm-reduction policies will entail fewer normative costs. As dis-
cussed above, the increased penalties for illegal abortions that result in 
the death of the patient may improve the market for safe illegal abor-
tions.210 
Perhaps recognizing that criminalization of dangerous abortions 
improves the first-order illegal abortion market might lessen the criticism 
of alternative harm-reduction strategies like the Uruguay Model by re-
ducing the degree to which they are seen as condoning illegal abortion. 
With recognition that criminalization and harm-reduction strategies have 
similar impacts on criminal markets, it may be possible to obtain the life-
saving benefits of some harm-reduction strategies without paying the cost 
of sending an ambiguous moral message about the underlying crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the criminalization of one activity may actually improve 
related criminal markets has profound implications for criminal justice 
policy and our normative understanding of criminal law. It is highly un-
likely that policymakers will ever be able to fashion an optimal scheme of 
crimes and punishments that maximizes the law's deterrent effect. How-
ever, the recognition that second-order crimes can perfect first-order 
criminal markets may encourage lawmakers to more fully evaluate the 
costs and benefits of using the criminal law to resolve social problems. 
Moreover, a deeper understanding of the impact that such crimes have 
on related criminal markets may improve lawmakers' accuracy as they 
seek to calibrate criminal penalties in a way that more fully promotes 
public welfare. At a minimum, recognizing criminal law's capacity to im-
prove criminal markets should improve the public discourse about crime 
and raise some skepticism about simplistic "tough on crime" solutions to 
complex social concerns. 
Finally, acknowledging the degree to which criminal laws facilitate 
antisocial activity can also promote a normative shift in our evaluation of 
harm-reduction policies that reduce the social and personal costs of 
committing crimes. Rather than undermine the moral authority of the 
criminal law, highlighting the degree to which such laws facilitate crimi-
209. Some prochoice advocates see this ambiguity as a positive step toward changing 
social attitudes about abortion. See Erdman, supra note 207, at 414-15 (discussing "con-
ceptual links between harm reduction and [reproductive] rights"). To the extent that 
highlighting criminalization's capacity to facilitate crime weakens the facilitation norm, it 
is possible that harm-reduction strategies will be less likely to change social attitudes about 
the underlying criminal activity. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 120-129 (explaining how increased penal-
ties increase confidence in safety of illegal procedures). 
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nal activity could destigmatize policies that may be useful alternatives to 
criminalization. 
